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Abstract 
In this thesis I have studied the influence of business actors in international environmental 
regimes. I argued that business actors have incentives to attempt to influence because they are 
target groups, and that they will most likely be able to succeed in this endeavor due to their 
central role in the implementation stage. The research question is formulated as: To what 
extent does the involvement and position of business actors in international environmental 
regimes affect the outcome of the regime? 
I investigated the research question by modeling influence as successful attempts to change 
the direction of international environmental regimes. I measured the correlation between (i) 
to what degree the business actors are involved and (ii) the direction they try to pull the 
regime in, and the outcome of the regime as the dependent variable, defined as (iii) 
compliance and (iv) regime effectiveness. This model enabled me to suggest that the 
probability of success in terms of behavioral change decreases if the business actors oppose 
the regime. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Why study business actors in international environmental regimes? 
It is by now well established that state actors are not the only actors in global politics (Nye 
and Keohane 1971). Changes in the international economic system have given 
environmentalism a new taste for business actors (Porter and Linde 1995; Vogel 1997). A 
common assumption is that business and industry opposes regulation because it represents a 
risk of profit reduction and economic loss. However, studies have shown that in certain cases 
they do the opposite (Vormedal 2008). In fact, this can be characterized as a change in 
business strategies (Hoffman 1997). 
Theories on international environmental regimes are sometimes criticized for being state-
centric and for not taking into account the context in which the regimes operate (Levy and 
Newell 2005). These theories focus on regime formation and, more recently, regime 
effectiveness
1
 (Breitmeier, Young, and Zurn 2006; Miles et al. 2002; Underdal 1992). A 
central concern in the literature focusing on regime effectiveness is identifying important 
variables for a successful outcome. There is a growing concern that non-state actors might be 
key determinants of the success of environmental protection efforts. Particular concern is 
directed towards business and industry actors (BI), who can be said to hold the key to 
behavioral change on the ground (Breitmeier, Young, and Zurn 2006; Falkner 2010; Levy and 
Newell 2005).  
Not only might business actors determine the outcome of international efforts, they are 
increasingly putting efforts into influencing this arena (Betsill and Corell 2008). Lobbying on 
the national level is well documented, but less documented is the effect this lobbying can have 
on international negotiations (Falkner 2008). 
This thesis investigates the role of business actors in international environmental regimes. 
More specifically, it will focus on the potential influence exerted by the business actors. I will 
                                                 
1 The term regime effectiveness will be defined later on; for now it suffices to say that it refers to the 
outcome of a regime or a cooperation effort. The ”success” of a regime is a term sometimes used to 
express to what extent the cooperation effort succeed in governing. 
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model influence as successful attempts to change the direction of international environmental 
policy processes. An important step will be to measure the correlation between business 
attitudes towards international environmental regimes and the outcome of the same regimes.  
The research question is formulated as follows:  
To what extent does the involvement and position of business actors in international 
environmental regimes affect the outcome of the regime? 
1.2 Introducing business actors and narrowing the scope 
Since Michael Porter (1995) concluded that environmentalism is necessarily not the opposite 
of competitiveness, a growing amount of research has been dedicated to the role of business 
actors in international environmental politics (Hoffman 1997; Levy and Newell 2005; Nowell 
1996).  
The increasing observations of influential business actors on the international arena have 
however yet to be followed by a consensual theoretical development. The well established 
theories of International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE) fall short in 
analyzing global environmental governance as of today, according to Levy and Newell 
(2005:21-23).   
Regime theory is the most common strand of IR focusing on environmental issues, but it fails 
to address the increasing role of business and corporate strategies (Levy and Newell 2005). 
This is a state-centric approach and does not analyze business actors as proper actors, nor has 
it addressed the presence of business actors in the negotiation process. 
On the other hand, IPE literature places state-market relations at the core of its analysis. It has, 
however, to a lesser extent focused on environmental issues (Levy and Newell 2005).  
To fill this seeming gap in the research field, Levy and Newell introduce what they call a neo-
gramscian approach to studying business in environmental governance (Levy and Newell 
2005). The neo-gramscian approach states that capitalist forces seek alliances with state and 
civil society actors in order to change the hegemonic order. The approach addresses 
relationships between national and international levels of analysis, between states and non-
state actors, and between agency and structural relations of power.  
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One strand of literature focuses on purely private governance initiatives (Auld, Gulbrandsen, 
and McDermott 2008). The Forest Stewardship Council is a prominent example of more or 
less successful private governance where state-led initiatives have failed. The mechanisms 
that make these governance efforts work is the purchase choice; they rely on consumer 
willingness to pay a little extra for green conscience (O'Neill 2009). However, private firms 
alone do not have the coercive power to impose regulations targeting all firms equally.  
The thesis will take the starting point in literature focusing directly on the influence of 
business actors in international environmental politics (Betsill and Corell 2008; DeSombre 
2000; Falkner 2008; Vormedal 2008). The theoretical framework will be developed with 
assumptions from this literature. It will in particular be distinguished between pushers, 
laggards and neutrals. These concepts are borrowed from the International Regime Database 
(IRD) (Breitmeier, Young, and Zurn 2006), and they are similar in content to green and grey 
business and industry non-governmental organizations (BINGOs) (Vormedal 2008). The 
color green is here refers to the perception of an environmental actor as ―green‖, whereas the 
opposite, the ―grey‖, refers to an actor who pollutes. 
Pushers are green business actors, i.e. business actors who support international 
environmental regulations. There can be different reasons why pushers support regulations, 
some considers it a business opportunity and others are seeking level playing fields 
(Vormedal 2008). Laggards are reactionary, grey business actors who oppose regulations 
because they are perceived to be too costly and reduce competitiveness (Vogel 1997). 
Neutrals are actors who are neither pushers nor laggards, but that adopt intermediate positions 
(Breitmeier, Young, and Zurn 2006). 
A business or industry actor will in this context be understood as an actor who represents a 
profit maximizing interest, in the sense that the actor first and foremost aims to secure the 
survival of the business in a market. I will not distinguish between business actors and 
industry actors.
2
 The position they adapt in the negotiations is assumed to be in line with their 
business strategies (Vormedal 2010).  
                                                 
2 The terms refer to the same category of actors. However, there are some differences in the everyday 
expressions. Industry is associated with what they do. Business is associated with how they do it.  
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1.3 The unit of analysis 
International environmental politics can be studied through the theoretical construct of 
regimes. International regimes can be perceived as efforts of international cooperation that 
attempt to govern international issues. The three concepts of international cooperation, 
regimes, and governance are however used somewhat interchangeably in the literature, and 
this section will briefly explore the links between them.  
The most widely used definition of international regimes is Krasner’s definition (1983). 
―International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures 
around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area.‖ The definition is not 
specifically formulated for environmental issues, rather it is meant to cover regimes 
facilitating liberal trade. This is generally not seen as a hinder for applying it to environmental 
regimes. 
Regimes can be seen as an operationalization of the concept of international cooperation. 
Regimes are attempts at establishing bodies for decision-making, in order to overcome the 
problem of anarchy on the international arena.  
Conceptually governance is a broader term. Levy and Newell (2005:2-3) reject the term 
regime and defines environmental governance as ―…the broad range of political, economic, 
and social structures and processes that shape and constrain actors’ behavior towards the 
environment. Environmental governance thus refers to the multiple channels through which 
human impacts on the natural environment are ordered and regulated. It implies rule 
creation, institution-building, and monitoring and enforcement. But it also implies a soft 
infrastructure of norms, expectations, and social understandings of acceptable behavior 
towards the environment, in processes that engage the participation of a broad range of 
stakeholders‖ (Levy and Newell 2005:2-3), my italics. 
They suggest this definition of governance in the context of introducing non-state actors. 
Thus, you would expect it to be different from the consensus definition of regime. 
Even though Levy and Newell reject the term regime, their definition of governance is quite 
similar in content to Krasner’s definition of regimes. An important difference, however, apart 
from the distinction made for environmental issue-areas, is the sentence focusing on multiple 
channels (2005). Regimes are thus assumed to be only one of these multiple channels.  
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The two notions of cooperation and governance play on different aspects of the phenomenon 
international regime. Cooperation refers to the part of regime that concerns state interaction 
and the challenges related to overcoming national sovereignty. Governance refers to the part 
of the regime that concerns exercising authority and policy-making.  
1.4 Research design 
The unit of analysis in this thesis is international environmental regimes. The dependent 
variable is the outcome of the regime, in terms of both compliance and regime effectiveness. 
Business actors will be analyzed as an independent variable that might affect the outcome of a 
regime. 
More specifically, business actors’ involvement and position in the formation of a regime3 will 
be studied. These two constructs will constitute the main independent variables in the 
analysis. They will appear both as dummies and as indexes. Involvement refers to their 
participation, and measures their degree of involvement as a continuum from low to high 
involvement according to where in the negotiation process they appear. The closer to 
decision-makers, the higher the degree of involvement. Position refers to their attitudes and 
business strategies as a continuum from support to opposition. 
The two dependent variables are compliance and regime effectiveness. The two variables are 
similar, and both attempt to capture the outcome of a regime. They are however too different 
to merge. Compliance is associated with the performance of the states, whereas regime 
effectiveness is associated with the actual behavioral change. 
In addition to what can be termed the ―business influence model‖, a set of control variables 
will be included. These control variables can be termed the ―basic model‖, because they have 
traditionally had some explanatory power on the dependent variables. These are rule depth, 
problem malignancy, uncertainty and decision rule. 
The data used in this thesis have been retrieved in two steps. The starting point was a dataset 
prepared for the study of Breitmeier, Underdal and Young (2009). I will henceforth refer to 
this as BUY. This dataset is based on the International Regime Database (IRD) (Breitmeier, 
                                                 
3 I will use the terms formation of regime and negotiations interchangeably throughout the thesis. 
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Young, and Zurn 2006). This dataset included all the variables except business involvement 
and business position. These two variables were created specifically for this study.  
I combine two multivariate techniques, namely logistic regression and partial correlations. 
The main analysis will be drawn from the logistic regression, and the partial correlations will 
be used to control the results in the logistic regression. I analyze the data stepwise. I first 
analyze the basic model in order to have a benchmark. I then introduce the business influence 
variables step by step.  
1.5 The findings 
One of the most important findings is that the position of business actors in the formation of 
regimes can be seen as a manifestation of the feasibility of the regime, and that business 
behavior is often the same before and after the regime is established, indicating that the 
regime does not change the course of action. 
I suggest that this finding can be viewed as a case of a weak regulatory capture, or a 
regulatory ―leash‖. Business actors can be said to have the power to block policy processes 
because they are in control of the implementation stage, indicating that the regulatory power 
of the states might not be absolute. Business actors do not however have complete control 
over the agenda-setting stage, given that many environmental problems do reach the scene 
and generate policy processes. 
The findings support theories developed on the basis of case studies suggesting that business 
and industry actors are pivotal actors in the field of international environmental politics. 
Specifically, it serves to support and nuance Falkner’s argument that business actors set the 
parameters for what is politically feasible, and that corporate responds have an important 
impact on the effectiveness of international regimes. 
A counter-intuitive finding is that compliance and regime effectiveness is negatively 
correlated, and this is also reproduced in every correlation with the business variables. It is 
suggested that this correlation can be interpreted as an expression of the difference between 
shallow and deep agreements, but the interpretations are inconclusive. 
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1.6 Outline 
In chapter 2 I present the theoretical framework. I start with asking the question of why we 
expect that business actors have influence in international environmental regimes. I also 
introduce the concept of regulatory capture. Furthermore I discuss in which direction they 
would pull the regime, looking at different roads to business position. 
Chapter 3 starts with developing a model for studying the influence of business actors in 
international environmental regimes empirically. I start with a definition of influence, and 
arrive at a model with two business related constructs and two outcome related constructs. 
The brother part of the chapter is devoted to operationalizations of these constructs, before I 
finish the chapter with methodological concerns and descriptive statistics.  
In chapter 4 I present the empirical results and suggest some possible interpretations. I will 
present both the logistic regression and the partial correlations, and the explained variance and 
the basic model will also be discussed. The two dependent variables will be compared. 
Chapter 5 provides concluding remarks. 
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2 Theoretical approaches 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will present the theoretical framework for assessing the influence of business 
actors in international environmental regimes. I will argue that business actors have the ability 
to rise to the occasion and exert influence beyond their lobbying clout, and this is the most 
fundamental hypothesis in the thesis. 
In order to distinguish business actors from other interest groups it is useful to think of the 
business actors as target groups (Skodvin, Gullberg, and Aakre 2010). As such the business 
actors play a double role in international environmental governance. They are not only 
interest groups lobbying for a higher moral standard; they are the subjects of regulation. In 
order to change an environmental problem it is in most cases business and industry that has to 
change behavior. The premises for the operations of these actors are dependent on the 
outcome of negotiations. Thus they have a motivation for trying to influence and control the 
development of new regulations. One response to the potential emergence of new regulations 
is to lobby the negotiations that lead to the formation of a regime.  
In section 2.2 I show why we can expect business influence in international environmental 
regimes. I do so by describing the sources of business influence, relational and structural 
power, and I introduce the concept of regulatory capture. In section 2.3 I show how business 
and industry actors can be understood as target groups. More specifically, I describe how the 
effects of potential regulations are different across the universe of business actors, and how 
that will affect the direction the business actors will try to pull the regime in. 
2.2 Why expect business influence in environmental regimes? 
In this section I will present the arguments for expecting business influence in international 
environmental regimes.  
Business actors possess knowledge and expertise about what is technologically possible at the 
time being. They are more capable of making a sound cost calculation than the decision-
makers. The decision-makers are thus dependent on getting information about the actual 
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situation on the field that is going to be regulated from the actors who are being regulated. 
The expertise and informational power possessed by business actors gives them a potential to 
influence the politics in the direction that is good for their business. This kind of power is 
termed relational power. 
The study of relational power is the traditional approach in empirical studies of non-state 
influence. It is usually assumed to rest on financial or informational resources. In the realm of 
business influence the relational power can be investigated through policy outcomes (Falkner 
2008:19). 
Target groups often have expert knowledge needed by the decision-makers to optimize policy 
outcomes (Skodvin, Gullberg, and Aakre 2010). What they specifically have expertise about 
is the process of implementation, the time frame, the constraints from technology and the cost 
of changing production.  
One theoretical approach believes that the influence of business actors will increase when 
they ally with environmentalists (DeSombre 2000). The basic idea is that business’ support 
for environmental regulations serves to enhance the business’ credibility. This legitimacy will 
give them greater influence on government officials. To understand why business would 
support regulations constraining their behavior, let us look at the Ozone case in some detail. 
In 1978 chlorofluorocarbons (CFSs) were prohibited in the United States, for nonessential 
aerosols, goods, drugs and medical or cosmetic products. This was before the Protocol entered 
into force in 1982. The US industry could have been hurt by national regulations, because it 
competed on the international market, against companies with lower, unregulated production 
costs. Instead, they adjusted and developed new technology. When US industry already had 
developed the new technology, they had a strong incentive to push for international regulation 
(DeSombre 2000).  
To be sure, business support for environmental regulations stems from the search for profit 
and not moral conviction. However, in supporting environmental regulations, business actors 
jump in bed with the environmentalists, creating a Baptists and bootleggers coalition 
(DeSombre 2000). This coalition gives business a newborn legitimacy. The credibility with 
decision-makers will increase when business actors present themselves as solution-providers 
to a politically defined problem. This will in turn make governments listen to business advice 
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and actively include corporate actors in the international political process, as was the case in 
Ozone depletion (Falkner 2005:129).  
On the other hand, Falkner argue, the greening of business actors does not automatically give 
the business actors increased leverage (Falkner 2008). The business group may have divergent 
interests due to the differentiated effects international regulations might have (Falkner 
2001:162). The fragmentation of the business community is a central determinant, negatively, 
of corporate influence in foreign policy (Falkner 2001:160). Such fragmentation can arise 
when international regulation creates competition advantage for some firms and an increase in 
production costs for others. Conflict lines can be found between national and international 
firms, market leaders and laggards and producers and industrial users (Falkner 2001:162-163). 
If the business group is fragmented, it will achieve less than if it is united. The fact that some 
firms support regulations and others do not can decrease the overall influence of business. 
This leads to the opposite implication than the one derived from deSombre; unless all firms 
decide to be supportive of regulations, which is unrealistic at this point in history, any partial, 
fragmented greening of business will reduce influence.  
In this thesis the empirical reference point for business involvement is business associations. 
An implication is that business associations that are general and therefore have to pursue 
lowest common denominator (like the International Chamber of Commerce). In this line of 
reasoning business and industry actors studied in this thesis will achieve little.   
 
―What is it that you want and how can we achieve that?‖4  
Business and industry is believed to have such a central position in the economy that they can 
control policy processes that will affect them. Policy-makers have to consider the broader 
economic impact environmental policies will have, and it is here that the business actors can 
set the parameters for what is politically feasible. This is referred to as structural power and is 
assumed to originate in the fact that they have control over the implementation phase of the 
regime.  
                                                 
4 The citation is from Vormedal (2008:51) and was said to a business man by a delegate during one of the 
negotiations in the Climate Change regime. 
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―Corporations thus shape the outcome of international regime-building efforts indirectly at the 
implementation stage, by producing political and technological feedback mechanisms that 
enhance or limit the effectiveness of regimes.‖ (Falkner 2008, :9). 
Business actors are a necessary part of the solution to environmental problems and the actual 
execution of the implementation happens in the hands of business and industry actors. When a 
state decides to cut emissions, it is the industry that will change production. The structuralists 
argue that ―[business’] consent is needed if profound changes to the working of the global 
economy are to be achieved through international regulation.‖ (Falkner 2010:101).  
A special form of structural power is technological power and comes from the fact that 
business actors control decisions on investment and technological innovation (Falkner 
2010:114). The Montreal Protocol serves to exemplify this kind of power as well, because 
DuPont did turn the premises for international negotiations up side down by developing the 
technology needed to substitute the CFCs (Barrett 2006; DeSombre 2000; Falkner 2005). 
Another form of structural power is regulatory capture (Falkner 2008:9). The concept is part 
of a theory labeled ―economics of regulation‖, which is mainly associated with the economist 
George Stigler (1971), but also with Mancur Olson (1965) and Richard Posner (1974). The 
theory was developed as a reaction to public interest theories of regulation, which ―holds that 
regulation is supplied in response to the demand of the public for the correction of inefficient 
or inequitable market practices‖ (Posner 1974:335). This is in many ways the conventional 
economic way to think of environmental regimes; a tool to deal with market failures that harm 
the environment, such as the economic externality of pollution (Concha 2006). In opposition 
to this view, the regulatory capture theory holds that ―…regulation is supplied in response to 
the demands of interest groups struggling among themselves to maximize the incomes of their 
members.‖ (Posner 1974:335). Environmental regulation is in this line of thought would then 
be maximizing the interests of business actors.  
The idea of regulatory capture puts the discussion of business influence in a different 
perspective. Instead of viewing business actors as lobbyists with extra influence or target 
groups, they might ―own‖ the regulation process more fundamentally. There are two possible 
implications of this theory. In the first scenario, the chain of events would be turned up side 
down; we could view the whole negotiation process as a result of a regulatory capture. One or 
more firms see the opportunity to develop new markets and thus push decision-makers to start 
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the negotiation process for an international agreement that would facilitate this market. In a 
way, this is what happened in the Ozone regime, except that regulations first were introduced 
on the domestic level against DuPont’s will.  
The second scenario is assuming a weak regulatory capture, or a regulatory “leash”. In this 
scenario the business actors are not the initiators of the process, but they are keeping the 
regulations close to their preferences. Business has not been able to keep environmental issues 
off the agenda altogether, which is an indicator that they do not control the whole process 
(Falkner 2008). The decision-makers recognize the problem and define it as a political 
problem, and so far business actors have had no important role. But when it is defined as a 
political problem and a policy process is initiated, the business actors might attempt to 
influence this process and be successful because they control the implementation process. 
According to Perman ―…to the extent it does take place, regulatory capture partly involves 
influence at the policy- or law-making stage, and partly in the processes by which laws are 
implemented and administered.‖ (Perman 2011:247). Here it is specified how regulatory 
capture might come about; it involves influence at the negotiation stage and influence at the 
stage of implementation. As such, it can be said to involve both relational power and 
structural power. 
2.3 In which direction do they pull the regime? 
If business actors have influence in international environmental politics, which direction will 
they pull the regime in? The default assumption is that they block environmental regulations 
because they represent a cost and loss of competitiveness. This might not be the whole truth. 
In the following I will argue that business actors not always play against the environment. 
More specifically, I will show how the position of a business actor is dependent on each 
business’ specific situation and how the proposed regulatory framework will work on their 
operation. For some business actors it can be profitable to act environmentally friendly. 
Different regulations will have different effect on different kinds of business actors. The way 
in which the regulations ―hit‖ them will determine how they will respond (Falkner 2008).  
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Laggard position is generated when compliance with provisions is perceived to be costly and 
when the provisions do not fit their taste.
5
 (Vormedal 2008) Global Climate Coalition is an 
example of an oppositional business actor from the Climate Change Regime, which mainly 
represented the fossil-fuel industry.
6
 In the Cartagena Protocol the industry actors were 
diversified, spanning from International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) to larger biotechnology 
companies such as Cargill and DuPont, and here the industry actors sought to narrow the 
mandate of the negotiations, but some also argued for harmonized regulatory framework 
(Burgiel 2008).  
The category of neutral includes business actors who are not lobbying for or against 
regulations. Neutrals adapt a wait and see attitude, but are not necessarily passive. An 
example could be a large company who has large resources and that will be relatively less 
hurt by compliance costs. These actors are however not assumed to be pulling the regime in 
any direction (Breitmeier, Young, and Zurn 2006). 
Pushers are actors that become advocates or leaders in the formation and implementation of 
regimes (Breitmeier, Young, and Zurn 2006). Pushers have reasons to support international 
environmental negotiations, and will thus end up arguing in the same direction in the 
negotiations. 
One type of pushers view prospective regulations as a business opportunity and promote 
stringent regulation. These businesses would benefit from the new market established when 
the regulations are implemented, because they already have the technology and would be able 
to enter the market right away (Vormedal 2008).  
The market leader might welcome new regulation because he knows that it would be difficult 
for his weaker competitors to comply (Falkner 2001:162-163). Market leaders can thus use 
regulatory politics to create new business models and achieve competitive advantage. Another 
opportunistic pusher is the small, innovative businesses that engage in new technology. These 
are not necessarily market leaders now, but might become one of the first in the newly 
established market in the aftermath of regulations. This has been observed in the EU; a tiny 
                                                 
5 Incentives are more attractive to business actors than regulations for example (Mitnick 1980). 
6 Global Climate Coalition does no longer exist, disbanded in 2002 (Vormedal 2008) 
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Icelandic producer of methanol used as synthetic fuel for cars lobbied the EU in order to 
change the regulations in a direction that would help their business.
7
  
Another type of pushers are those who prefer harmonization and level playing fields 
(Vormedal 2008). These are firms operating in international markets, as opposed who those 
who mainly operate in their home country (Falkner 2008). International firms that operate on 
different national markets are likely to prefer that all markets have the same regulations, 
because this kind of harmonization can reduce transaction costs from operating in multiple 
regulatory environments. When they operate on an international market they would also rather 
that there be an international agreement than a national legislation. National firms, on the 
other side, are likely to oppose international rule setting and prefer national trade barriers.  
A third dimension is that large companies have more capital, are often better equipped with 
legal and environmental expertise and are more exposed and more vulnerable for campaigns. 
Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs
8
) represent a high proportion of enterprises in 
industrialized economies, and they tend to have a higher level of environmental impact per 
unit (Gunningham and Sinclair 2002). Small businesses are more vulnerable to additional 
costs than are larger businesses and that suggest that they are prone to adapt a negative 
attitude.  
A similar but slightly different source of business support, are those who already have been 
subject to domestic regulations (DeSombre 2000). An important source of international 
cooperation efforts where business plays a role is domestic environmental regulation that in 
turn has led firms to develop new technology and convinced their governments to pursue an 
internationalization of the regulation. Internationalization is defined ―… as an official 
governmental attempt to gain adherence by other states to a level of environmental regulation 
similar to that in effect for the state in question on a particular issue.‖ (DeSombre 2000:7). 
When the pusher attitude is expressed at the domestic level, studying participation in 
international negotiations will not capture this influence. However, this type of pushers are 
also participating and influencing the international level (Burgiel 2008; Vormedal 2008).  
                                                 
7 The company argued that synthetic fuels should be treated equally as biofuels (Informal conversation 
with the manager). 
8 One definition of SME is a company that has less than 200 employees, butt his is not a consensus 
definition. 
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The ozone regime is in many instances referred to as the most clear-cut example of business 
influence. The impact of business and industry in this regime was treated by (Benedick, Fund, 
and Diplomacy 1998; DeSombre 2000; Falkner 2005). In this regime one large firm managed 
to turn the table, namely the famous DuPont. This was a unique example of technological 
opportunism. There are not many examples of technological opportunism in the universe of 
international environmental regimes besides the Ozone regime (DeSombre 2000). 
Furthermore, the US prohibited the use of CFCs for a range of products already in 1978, 
before the international agreement entered into force in 1982. By pushing internationalization 
they could level the playing fields and become leading firm in the new markets. DuPont saw 
an opportunity for becoming the market leader. They communicated to the US governors that 
they would readily invest in technology needed to achieve the domestic goals, if the US 
governors pushed for an international agreement (Barrett 2006; DeSombre 2000). 
Some theorists expect that the most preferred channel for influence is the domestic. More 
specifically it is argued, ―… business is likely to prefer acting at the national level where it 
enjoys well-charted and predictable channels of influence‖ (Levy and Egan in Vormedal 
2008:36). Then there would be little influence on the international level. 
International firms that have not been subject to domestic regulations are not necessarily 
pushers. They are most likely to be on the fence, at the same time preferring international 
regulations rather than special national regulations. Thus, a company that expects future 
regulations in the home country might want to support an international framework. An 
alternative strategy for these businesses could be to threaten to move their business elsewhere 
(Skodvin, Gullberg, and Aakre 2010). 
2.4 Summary  
To sum up, business actors are expected to have influence in international environmental 
policy processes. There are two sources of influence, relational power and structural power. 
Relational power is the power that is expressed through lobbying and expertise. Structural 
power is the power that is executed through control over the implementation process, where 
business actor can exert pressure beyond their lobbying clout. Regulatory capture is assumed 
to fathom the relational power and the structural power. Business actors will try to pull the 
regime in the direction that is suitable for their business, and that can be either pusher or 
laggard or neutral. 
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Expectations from the theoretical approach are as follows: (a) business actors will attempt to 
influence the formation of regimes through lobbying, (b) business actors will either be driving 
forces or blockers or in between, (c) the behavior of the states will change in the direction 
desired by the business actors. 
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3 Methodology  
3.1 Introduction 
The main question in this chapter is how I can go about to answer the research question 
empirically. As indicated in the introductory chapter I will develop a model with business 
involvement and business position as main independent variables, and I will measure the 
correlation with two measures of outcome, compliance and regime effectiveness. I will use 
the control variables as a baseline. 
In the section 3.2 I will develop a model for studying the influence of business actors in 
international environmental regimes. In section 3.3 I will operationalize business involvement 
and business position, which will also include accounting for choices I made in transferring 
the variables to SPSS. In section 3.4 I will operationalize compliance and regime 
effectiveness and in section 3.5 I will operationalize the basic model. In section 3.6 I will 
account for how I have coded missing. Section 3.7 briefly considers methodological concerns 
that are not addressed underway, before section 3.8 will show the descriptive statistics for the 
business variables and the dependent variables. 
3.2 A model for studying the influence of business actors  
―Influence is defined here as the activities of actor A bringing about intended effects in the 
behavior of actor B.‖ (Vormedal 2008:44). This definition includes both the influence attempt 
and the success of such an attempt, i.e. actual modification of one actor’s behavior by that of 
another. Thus, influence is a two-dimensional concept (i) advocacy and lobbying and (ii) 
causing intended effects in the behavior of other actors.  
According to the first part of the definition there has to be intentional communication from 
one actor to another. Intentional communication is the purpose of lobbying; ―In international 
politics, lobbying state actors is the standard way for non-state actors to influence outcomes.‖ 
(Falkner 2008:27-28). Business actors that lobby international environmental negotiations are 
thus the scope of empirical analysis. This suggests using an indicator that measures the degree 
of involvement in international environmental negotiations, i.e. regime formation.  
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Using a construct that measures the degree of involvement allows me to consider the 
closeness to the decision-makers. A business that sits in the hall might not have the same 
chance of succeeding with his influence attempt as a business actor that is invited to the table. 
Furthermore, observers in international negotiations are present in the negotiations, but they 
do not, as measured by the indicator, attempt to exert influence.  
The definition says that influence does not occur unless the influence attempt has generated 
intended effects in the behavior of other actors. The actor B in this situation would be states. 
In order to assess influence, according to this definition, we would measure the effects in the 
behavior of the states, which in the scope of this thesis is the outcome of a regime. Intended 
effects could be a continuation and strengthening of the formation of the regime or a delay or 
even stop in the process. 
We need to know whether the behavior of states is changed in the direction that is desired by 
the business actors. Even though business is communicating their interests to the decision-
makers, we have no insurance that the outcome of the process reflects the interests of the 
business actors. Thus, we have to find a method of analysis that increases the likelihood that 
the observed business lobbying has actually led to behavioral change with the states. 
To establish a causal relationship requires more than can be achieved through investigation of 
correlation. However, for causality to occur, probability is a necessary condition (Gerring 
2005). The likelihood of a causal relationship between influence attempt and change in 
behavior increases if it can be shown that the behavior of the states has changed in the 
direction desired by the business actor. 
If the business actors lobby for delaying or hindering the policy process and the behavior of 
states reflects this by having the character of less behavioral change than what would have 
occurred otherwise, it is likely that there has been a transfer of will. Transfer of will refers 
here to the operation that occurs when a business actor succeed in his influence attempt. This 
operation is perceived to be more than a transmission of information (Vormedal 2008:44), 
because the operation attempts to induce change in behavior. 
Opposite, if business actors lobby for generating progress, and the behavior of states reflects 
this by having the character of more behavioral change than what would have occurred 
otherwise, it is likely that there has been a transfer of will. By saying that it is likely, I mean to 
say that it is more likely than if this correlation of events had not been present.  
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The yardstick for what would have occurred otherwise will here be thought of as the 
counterfactual that business did not intervene and the formation of the regime went on as 
usual. The drawback of using this yardstick is that we do not know what ―as usual‖ entails, 
since successful regimes are dependent on a variety of factors, among them problem 
malignancy and uncertainty being exogenous factors that will vary from regime to regime. 
Despite the drawback, it does not make sense to measure a change from A to B not knowing 
whether A is in front of or behind B. For analytical purposes I will assume that the ―as usual‖ 
scenario entails that the regime is actually formed and that behavior is changed to a moderate 
degree, so that there is room for both delay and progress. Without making this assumption, it 
does not make sense to say that business actors attempt to change the behavior of states. 
This suggests using an indicator that measures the position business actors take in the 
negotiations. This dimension captures their strategic choices and the attitudes towards 
regulations. The relevant information according to the theoretical framework is whether they 
support regulations, oppose them, or adapt a wait-and-see attitude.  
This suggests a model that takes on two indicators ―degree of involvement‖ and ―position‖. I 
will analyze these two dimensions individually because they are quite different in content and 
direction.
9
 
Business actors can be represented in international negotiations as individual firms or as 
business associations. The latter is more common, at least in the Climate Change Regime 
(Vormedal 2008), but in the Ozone regime DuPont played solo. Business associations are 
general and therefore have to pursue lowest common denominator (like the International 
Chamber of Commerce). In the climate regime there has been implemented a requirement that 
all non-state actors be non-profit organizations (Vormedal 2008). This effectively reduces the 
amount of individual large firms and increases the number of BINGOs in that regime. 
Whether this type of requirement exists in other regimes is not clear, but the tendency is still 
the same; most of the business actors are associations of some kind.  
                                                 
9 An alternative approach could be to merge them. The direction of these two dimensions might in some 
cases be similar, according to deSombre. The greener you are the greater credibility you have with the 
decision makers. This credibility could be translated into an invitation to sit closer to the decision makers. 
If this hypothesis was made an assumption, this assumption could give support to an approach of merging 
them. This approach will however not be taken.  
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To sum up, we need to know (a) whether the behavior of the targeted actor has changed in the 
direction desired by the influencer and (b) whether this change can be attributed – in whole or 
in part – to the influence attempt.  
3.3 Operationalizations 
Operationalization of concepts that are going to be relevant across many situations is bound to 
have a general character. This is especially true across the population of regimes, where the 
units differ in more than a few aspects. In some cases, all they have in common is being a 
cooperation effort, while they differ on policy area (although they are all environmental, this 
is not a homogenous category), participants, costs involved and solution type.  
In this section I will explain how the variables have been constructed. The first variables 
(1.7.1-1.7.6) were already transferred to SPSS (IBM 1968) format by Breitmeier et al (2009), 
so for these variables I will indicate which query in the IRD they are based on and how they 
are coded in the BUY.
10
 For the business variables (1.7.7-1.7.8) that I have transferred 
manually, I will provide a more extensive elaboration on the choices I made on the way.  
A challenge here is that the information in the IRD is on two levels, but I only need one level. 
The information in IRD is structured in the following manner: Each unit (regime component) 
is listed with registered non-state actors, ‖sub-units‖. The information that I am looking for, 
position and involvement, is connected to these sub-units. My operation was to connect the 
information directly to the main units. I solve this by framing it so that each unit either has a 
BI (level 1) that plays one of the active roles (level 2), or it doesn’t. This dichotomy reduces 
the information, but for purposes of statistical analysis this is a necessary sacrifice.  
3.3.1 Business position 
Business position has three values. 
 Pusher (supporting regime formation); 1=present, 0=not present 
o An actor that plays an active role in the political process; generates or 
promotes new ideas, knowledge, or policies; lobbies for political measures at 
the international level; and plays an advocacy role for regime formation 
 Neutral; 1=present, 0=not present 
                                                 
10 The full version of queries is provided in the appendix. 
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o An actor adopting an intermediate position in between the pushers and the 
laggards, or an actor adopting a wait and see attitude. 
 Laggard (opposing regime formation); 1=present, 0=not present 
o An actor that strongly opposes regime formation and lobbies against it. An 
extreme laggard may act as a politically active counterpart to extreme pushers 
and pushers in the regime formation process and may generate new ideas and 
promote concepts and knowledge to oppose regime formation. 
In the IRD this construct is represented by question RF32; ―106B For each of the important 
non-state actors identified in the pre-coding agreement, indicate whether that non-state actor 
was a pusher, a laggard, or neutral. Include other non-state actors if especially noteworthy.‖  
The same principle is applied here as with the business role variable. In order to receive the 
score of 1 on the business position dummies, the regime component has to be listed with at 
least one business or industry actor, assigned with the position in point. For each regime 
component listed with one or more actors identified as a business or industry actor, it is 
determined which position the actor has with regards to supporting or opposing regulations. 
3.3.1.1 vRF32 Dummies  
Based on query RF32 in IRD I create three dummies, RF32_push, RF32_neut, RF32_lagg. 
The original variable has five values, including extreme pusher and extreme laggard. I do not 
expect this nuance to have an effect on the dependent variable. In political science we are 
generally more interested in the direction than the exact quantity of something, except from 
the situation where you expect a threshold effect, and this is not the case here. The most 
important feature is whether the business actor advocates for or against regulations or a wait 
and see attitude. 
Since it is possible that a unit has more than one business actor, and thus also business actors 
advocating in both directions, I create dummies for this variable too.  
A challenge that arises quickly is an ambiguity between the coders. In toscana unit 20601 and 
10601 the coders have opposite opinions about the same BI, the first one coding it as a 
laggard and the second coding as a pusher. The same thing happens with toscana units 10029 
and 20029, and 10701 and 20701. This is inevitable when gathering data like this and 
considering that it is only a few units it will not be corrected. There is also some ambiguity in 
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within the ozone regime, although not on the exact same unit and it might actually be the case 
that a BI changes its interests during the regime’s life span. 
An alternative to making dummies is to follow the same pattern of dividing them, but to give 
them values after how many pushers or laggards there are. Only one BI would give the unit a 
score of 1 and two or more BIs would give it a score of 2. Business associations might receive 
a 2 since it is representing more than one BI.  
On the other hand the amount of actors is not likely to change anything on the dependent 
variable; DuPont for example turned the table on its own. Furthermore, in the data for the 
climate regime for example the actors per se are not pronounced, only the kind of actor 
(obstructionist business actors). And, given the characteristic of the database, such an 
indicator would not be especially trustworthy. 
3.3.1.2 vRF32 Index 
I also create an index based on RF32. The index has four values: 
0=No business actors 
1=Only laggards 
2=Neutral or a combination of any of the three values 
3=Only pushers 
The index is thus going from business actors negative towards regime formation, to business 
actors positive towards regime formation. A positive relationship with the dependent variable 
will thus imply that ―pushers‖ has a positive effect on regime effectiveness.  
I refer to this variable throughout the paper as both attitude and position. I keep the term 
position here, in order to be clear about which query in the IRD I am referring to.  
3.3.2 Business involvement 
Business role is a set of dummies, with four values.  
* Member of national delegation; 1=present, 0=not present 
* Member of negotiation body; 1=present, 0=not present 
* Exert pressure inside the negotiations; 1=present, 0=not present 
* Exert pressure outside the negotiations; 1=present, 0=not present 
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―Present‖ entails that a regime component has a business or industry actor participating in the 
process as indicated by the four dummies. One does not exclude the other, so a regime 
component might score ―present‖ on more than one role. 
The two business variables are created specifically for this study, based on data material 
provided by the IRD. 
In the IRD this construct is represented by question RF49; ―109H What roles did non-state 
actors play in the negotiations?‖ The coding in the IRD is such that each regime component 
has a list of non-state actors in general, also including environmental NGOs (non 
governmental organizations) etc. that are all assigned with roles. In order to receive the score 
of 1 on the business role dummies, the regime component has to be listed with at least one 
business or industry actor, as identified in Appendix B, assigned with the role in point.  
The variable is structured so as to say what role each of the identified non-state actors play. If 
the WWF has been identified as one of the non-state actors participant in the negotiation it is 
then listed in what ways the WWF has been taken part. The different ways to play a role are 
the following; Observe, Member of national delegation, Member of negotiation body, Exerted 
pressure inside the negotiations, Exerted pressure outside the negotiations. I will not use the 
Observer value because it is not relevant for the research question. 
3.3.2.1 vRF49 Dummies 
To create this variable I first make a cross tabulation of the Toscana values and the BusInd 
variable. Toscana values refer to the identification number in the original data set. BusInd 
variable refer to the variable created in the BUY dataset, which is based on RF31 in the 
original dataset. If a unit (toscanaID) is assigned any of the values 5, 6 or 7 in this query in 
IRD, it will receive a score of 1 in the BUY. This means that the BusInd variable indicates 
whether or not there are business or industry actors present in the negotiations; present not 
being further specified. In order to answer the research question in this thesis I will go on to 
further specify this variable; mainly on two levels: given that business actors are present, what 
is the degree of involvement in the negotiations? And secondly, regardless of degree of 
involvement; are they pushers, laggards or neutral?  
When there is more than one business actor per unit, the strategy I will follow is to assign the 
dummies 1 in the case of at least one BI in the category.   
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I create a dummy variable set with the information contained in Negotiation_status (RF49). 
This query describes what role the non-state actor played in the negotiations in that particular 
regime component. I limit the information by only coding for the units that are registered as 
having multinational companies (MNCs) or national or international industry associations, i.e. 
business and industry actors. Thus, components that do not have any business or industry 
actors are left out, and the negotiation status for non-state actors such as Greenpeace, i.e. 
environmental NGOs (ENGOs) are not part of these variables. I have named the dummies 
Member_national, Member_negotiation, Exert_inside, Exert_outside.    
In the coding I discovered some instances of inconsistency, which were treated in the 
following manner: 
 If the unit is scored with BusInd, and I can find BIs with identified roles, the unit may 
score on all the dummies. 
 If the unit is scored with BusInd, and I can’t find any BIs with identified roles, they 
are left missing, assuming that the coder did not have sufficient information. 
 If the unit is not scored with BusInd, and I can’t find any BIs with identified roles, 
they receive a score of 0 on all the dummies. 
 If the unit is not scored with BusInd, but I identify an actor that fit the definition of BI 
with accompanying role, the unit may score on all the dummies. 
3.3.2.2 vRF49 Index 
I also create an index based on vRF49. The index assumes that the closer you are to the 
decision makers the higher the degree of involvement. Member of national delegation and 
negotiation body are assumed to both be insider positions and are thus merged into one value. 
The final index thus has three values and is thus going from low degree of involvement to 
high degree of involvement. 
1=Low degree of involvement (Exert pressure outside the negotiations) 
2=Intermediate degree of involvement  (Exert pressure inside the negotiations) 
3=High degree of involvement (Inside position, member of national delegation or member of 
the negotiation body) 
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3.4 The outcome of regimes 
How can we measure the behavior of states? In order to assess whether business actors make 
a difference to outcomes of international processes, I will measure the effect on the outcome 
of the regimes. 
I will use two dependent variables, compliance and regime effectiveness. They both attempt 
to capture the same phenomenon that is the outcome of international cooperation, but they 
emphasize different aspects. Compliance is associated with the performance of the states, 
whereas regime effectiveness is associated with the actual behavioral change.  
3.4.1 Compliance  
The assessment of compliance is associated with the performance of the states. According to 
Oran Young (1979) ―Compliance can be said to occur when the actual behavior of a given 
subject conforms to prescribed behavior, and non-compliance or violation occurs when actual 
behavior departs significantly from prescribed behavior.‖ (Simmons 1998). This definition 
excludes both implementation and regime effectiveness. Implementation can be defined as: 
―the adoption of domestic rules or regulations that are meant to facilitate, but do not in 
themselves constitute, compliance with international agreements.‖ (Simmons 1998:77). 
Compliance is then understood as the domestic enforcement of such facilitation. 
Furthermore, ―compliance is rarely a transparent, binary choice‖ (Simmons 1998:78). By this 
it is understood that agreements are often ambiguous and subject to interpretation, and any 
measure of compliance will therefore also be to some extent subject to interpretation. 
According to Murdoch and Sandler there is a possibility that the states will act as though they 
are complying with the regime, but in reality they are only pursuing the policy that they 
intended to in the first place. An example is the Montreal Protocol. It is shown that the US, 
and other industrialized states, had unilateral interests in providing this public good(Murdoch 
and Sandler 1997). This is good seen from an environmental perspective, but it reduces the 
explanatory power of cooperation efforts. Any assessment of compliance should therefore 
make sure that the compliance is a result of the regime. 
Compliance will be operationalized using the indicator ―Conformity‖.11 
                                                 
11 Compliance and conformity will be used interchangeably in the thesis  
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In the IRD compliance is represented by RC5; ―303A Does the behavior of important actors 
generally conform with the provisions of the regime? Did the regime exert a causal influence 
on these developments?‖ 
The variable is a dichotomy with 0 indicating that the members only conforms with some of 
the provisions, or less, and 1 indicating that the members’ behavior meets regime 
requirements or more. 
This variable is divided in two in the IRD, as indicated by the two questions. In the BUY 
dataset, this variable is merged into one. It is first weighted through multiplication, before 
creating dichotomies with the values 1 and 0. A unit receives the score of 1 on the final 
variable only if it has a score on the high end of the scale on both the questions.  
When creating dichotomies, values 1-2 are assigned 1, and values 3-5 are assigned 0. 
3.4.2 Regime effectiveness  
A regime is effective ‖[…] to the extent that it successfully performs a certain (set of) 
function(s) or solves the problems that motivated its establishment.‖ (Underdal 2002a:4). This 
definition is in many ways the consensus definition of regime effectiveness, first spelled out 
by Underdal (1992), read in Underdal (2002a). It emphasizes the functional performance and 
problem solving of a regime. 
The stages of a regime, and also the performance to be evaluated, are referred to as output, 
outcome and impact. The relationship between them is an assumed causal relationship 
between events. Output is the end product of regime formation, i.e. a new set of rules and 
regulation. Outcome is the behavioral change generated by implementation. Impact is the 
change in the biophysical environment (Underdal 2002a:6).  
Measuring regime effectiveness is a complicated task. Classifying a regime as effective 
requires more than simply just looking at the regime; 
‖[…] Determining regime effectiveness is not merely a matter of descriptive measurement; it 
is as much an exercise in causal inference. In addressing the question of whether or to what 
extent a regime made a difference, we compare the state of affairs that obtains with the regime 
in place with the hypothetical situation that would have occurred in its absence. In doing so, 
we not only try to measure difference, we also attribute the difference in human behavior or 
the health of the environment to the existence or operation of a regime.‖ (Underdal 2002b:52).  
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If you observe behavioral change or problem solving in the aftermath of the creation of a 
regime, this might be due to the regime, or it might be due to other things. The financial crisis 
in 2008 was followed by a decline in production, which naturally reduced emission. 
Behavioral change may be correlated with the establishment of a regime, but it is not always 
correct to assume a causal effect.  
Put simply, causality means that X is (part of) the reason why Y occurred. More specifically; 
‖Minimally, causes may be said to refer to events or conditions that raise the probability of 
some outcome occurring (under ceteris paribus conditions). X may be considered a cause of Y 
if (and only if) it raises the probability of Y.‖ (Gerring 2005:169). 
In this particular study, the inherent causal assumption in the concept of regime effectiveness 
might be more than a methodological challenge. This can be illustrated with the example of 
the Montreal Protocol, which is identified to be the paradigmatic example of the role of 
business and industry. The regime achieved high scores on behavioral change and distance to 
collective optimum, the two indicators of regime effectiveness (Wettestad 2002:164). In the 
period 1987-1996 the regime received the highest score on both dimensions. Using the model 
in Miles et al led to a conclusion that the regime had significant effects on the state of affairs.  
An alternative explanation is offered by (DeSombre 2000). She has suggested that the main 
reason why the Montreal Protocol was effective was action taken by the industrial lobby in 
the United States (DeSombre 2000:27). The American company DuPont played an important 
role in making the ozone regime effective, by developing new technology and changing the 
premises for political discussion. The behavioral change thus came before the regime was put 
in place.  
This argument, if correct, might intuitively weaken the causal effect of the regime itself. If the 
variable with the most explanatory power lies outside the realm of the regime, then it is 
difficult to argue that the regime is an important independent variable.  
For this reason the regime effectiveness
12
 variable is a construct of two queries, one 
addressing the substantial question and the other addressing the question of causality. The 
coder must treat this matter with cautiousness, not merely as an empirical observation, for 
example through the means of process tracing.  
                                                 
12 Regime effectiveness will in this thesis be used interchangably with problem change.  
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The problem change (or regime effectiveness) variable will thus be understood as change in 
the state of the world that can be attributed to the working of the regime. Implementation will 
be understood as part of problem change. 
The variable is a dichotomy with 0 indicating low effect (the problem stayed the same or 
worsened), and 1 indicating high effect (that the problem improved slightly to considerably).  
In the IRD this dimension of regime effectiveness is represented by RC11; ―304A How did 
the state of the world change during this period with respect to the problems addressed by the 
regime? Did the regime exert a causal influence on these developments?‖ 
This variable is divided in two in the IRD, as indicated by the two questions. In the BUY 
dataset, this variable is merged into one. It is first multiplied and weighted, before creating 
dichotomies with the values 1 and 0. A unit receives the score of 1 on the final variable only if 
it has a score on the high end of the scale on both the questions.  
When creating dichotomies, values 1-3 are assigned 0, and values 4-5 are assigned 1. 
3.5 Control variables 
3.5.1 Problem malignancy 
Malignancy is a complex construct, and here it will be understood as a two dimensional 
concept. 
―The political malignancy of a problem will here be conceived of primarily as a function of 
the conﬁguration of actor interests and preferences that it generates. According to this 
conceptualization, a perfectly benign problem would be one characterized by identical 
preferences. The further we get from that state of harmony, the more malign the problem 
becomes.‖ (Underdal 2002a:15) 
In this thesis I will use a construct of malignancy that has two dimensions. The first 
dimension gives an indication of how similar or un-similar each country perceives of the 
problem and the means necessary to solve it in terms of costs and benefits. This query fits 
well into the incongruity-coordination continuum identified in Underdal (2002a:21), more 
particularly with the dimension of the ―Essence of the problem‖. A problem of incongruity is 
characterized by incentive distortion, whereas a problem of coordination is characterized by 
imperfect information and communication failure.  
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The first dimension is represented by this query: ―101I Regarding interests involved in the 
issue area: How compatible/incompatible were the interests of the parties?‖ 
The second dimension addresses the assumption that some problems only require 
coordination of behavior, and thus there will be no need for anything else than a common 
understanding of how to behave. This query fits well into the incongruity-coordination 
continuum identified in (Underdal 2002a:21), more specifically under the dimension of ―post-
agreement implications". Coordination problems are ―self-enforcing; no incentives for 
unilateral defection from an agreed solution‖, whereas in incongruity problems ―incentives to 
unilaterally defect tend to persist; transparency, monitoring, and enforcement mechanism 
important‖.  
The second dimension is represented by this query: ―101G Regarding interests involved in the 
issue area: Was there an incentive to disobey the rules even after the regime was put in 
place?‖ 
One implication of this definition of malignancy is that fisheries are more malignant than 
pollution problems. In pollution problems, when the regime’s requirements are implemented, 
this commonly entails finding a substitution to the behavior. An example of this is the Ozone 
problem, where the solution entailed finding a substitute for CFCs. After this substitute is 
adapted and implemented, there are few reasons for any state to disobey with the rules. For 
fisheries on the other hand, there will always be an incentive to disobey. 
In summary then, problem malignancy is a two-dimensional understanding of the conceptual 
continuum of the incongruity-coordination problem. A low score indicates a problem of 
coordination, while a high score indicates a problem of incongruity and incentive distortion. 
Malignancy has three values, with 1 indicating low malignancy, 2 indicating medium 
malignancy and 3 indicating high malignancy.  
In the IRD this construct is represented by questions RF7 (101G) and RF9 (101I). 
This variable is constructed of addition and mean. The values of each query are added 
together, and a rounded-up mean constitute the value of the final variable.  
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3.5.2 Uncertainty 
Uncertainty has in other statistical studies of regime effectiveness been statistically interacting 
with malignancy (Miles et al. 2002). 
The variable is a dichotomy with 0 indicating low uncertainty (strong or very strong 
established understanding) and 1 indicating high uncertainty (that the understanding of a 
problem was partially, low or not at all established). 
In the IRD this construct is represented by question RF22 ―104A Was the nature of the 
problem well understood?‖ 1-2 becomes 0 and 3-5 becomes 1.  
3.5.3 Rule depth 
―The key to effectiveness is once again deep and dense rules‖ (Breitmeier 2009:22). 
Depth as measured as rule density and specificity refers to an outcome of the negotiations, 
namely the rules that the states have agreed to follow. There are two extremes on this 
continuum, which can be referred to as deep and shallow regimes.  
The construct of shallowness also appears in the article by Downs et al (1996). Here, it is 
meant to capture the idea that some regimes are merely codifications of preceding efforts 
(Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996:391). The opposite treaty characteristic of shallowness is 
depth, which can be understood as ―…the extent to which it requires states to depart from 
what they would have done in its absence‖ (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996:383). What 
the states would have done in a regime’s absence refers to the non-cooperative outcome, 
which is a counter-factual. In this sense, shallowness is compared to the non-cooperative 
outcome.  
In the IRD understanding of rule density and specificity, the depth is compared to what is 
considered necessary to solve the problem. I will assume that there is a straight line between 
what is necessary to solve the problem and the cooperative outcome, so that shallowness as 
used by Downs et al is the opposite concept to rule depth in IRD.  
Rule depth has three values, with 1 indicating low shallowness, 2 indicating medium 
shallowness and 3 indicating high shallowness.  
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In the IRD this construct is represented by question RA15; ―205G Is the regime shallow or 
deep as measured by the density and specificity of its rules?‖ 1-2 becomes 3, 3 becomes 2 and 
4-5 becomes 1.  
3.5.4 Decision rules 
Decision rules are believed to be associated with impact of business actors; ―Decision-making 
rules specify the level of support necessary for collective decision to be adopted and may have 
a distinct impact on target group influence‖ (Skodvin, Gullberg, and Aakre 2010:857). The 
reason for this expectation is that when there is a demanding decision rule the business only 
needs to convince one or a minority of decision-makers to succeed in their effort.  
―Decision rules‖ has two values, with 0 indicating Unanimity and Consensus and 1 indicating 
everything else (Weighted/unweighted voting, Qualified majority, Simple majority, Right to 
opt-out - file objection). 
In the IRD this construct is represented by question RA32; ―210B What decision rules does 
the regime provide for and use in arriving at decisions?‖ 
3.6 Missing 
For all the variables taken from the BUY (1.1.1-1.1.6), units that have received scores such as 
―do not know’, ―non-applicable‖ or do not exist, or similar, in the IRD are coded as missing. 
The variables created for this study (1.1.7-1.1.8) the same approach is taken. One 
specification should be made. In the creation of the business variables, I used a variable in 
BUY indicating whether there was a business actor present in the negotiation or not, to help 
narrow the sample. This was based on RF31 in IRD, which asks coders to indicate whether or 
not different types of non-state actors were present. It did however happen that units were 
registered with a business actor in RF31, and not in the RF49 and RF32. Thus, if a unit 
received a positive score on RF31, but no business or industry actor is specified in RF49 or 
RF32, it is assumed that the coders did not have the information, and this unit will be coded as 
missing. On the other hand, if a unit has no business or industry actor in neither RF31 nor 
RF49/32, the unit scores 0. 
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3.7 Methodological concerns 
The IRD and the final dataset used in the thesis are built up of regime components. The 
empirical universe consists of 23 regimes.
13
 Each regime usually consists of a number of 
agreements that are independent in time and setting. To say that they are completely 
independent of each other would however not be completely correct. They are of course 
within the same regime, and time can be an important factor to whether the regime is 
successful or not. Thus there might be some dependency between the units. However, the 
analysis addresses specific correlations that are not believed to be crucially affected by this.  
Having two coders code each regime component further splits the data. The reason for this is 
it that it decreases the likelihood of bias, and if there is controversy to some of the scoring, 
this will be balanced. This makes the units even more dependent of each other. 
Units are seldom completely independent of each other. It is common to assume that when the 
sample is drawn randomly from the universe, the dependency can be overlooked because then 
the dependency is random rather than caused by selection bias. In this case the units are not 
completely random, they are chosen because they are international environmental regimes. 
Because I will only draw inference over the sample and not be preoccupied with generalizing 
to other regimes, these issues are not as crucial as they necessarily are when you wish to 
generalize to a bigger universe. 
This points to a central idea in this statistical analysis. I wish to see patterns across regimes, 
not generalize. I am confident that this goal can be safely achieved despite the concerns 
presented here. 
I will use the term ―effect‖ throughout the analysis. This refers to the correlation, and the 
assumed temporal relationship between the variables, not an understanding of statistics as 
causal. 
                                                 
13 See appendix for complete list of regimes. 
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3.8 Descriptive statistics 
In this section I will briefly present the descriptive statistics for the business variables and the 
dependent variables. For descriptive data of the control variables, see Breitmeier; Underdal 
and Young (2006). 
Table 1 shows the frequency of success in terms of compliance and problem change. It shows 
that approximately half of regime formation processes end up with a positive outcome. It also 
shows that it is more difficult to achieve actual problem change than compliance. 
 
0 1 Total (Valid cases) Standardized 
Conformity dic 45 73 118 0,62 
Problem change dic 68 77 145 0,53 
Table 1 Frequencies for the dependent variables 
How frequent are business actors participating in international environmental regime 
formation and negotiation? A pattern that emerges from these frequencies is that it is more 
common for business actors to exert pressure inside or outside the negotiations, than to have 
―insider positions‖. Laggards, pushers and neutrals appear approximately equally often. 
 
0 1 
Total (Valid 
cases) Standardized 
NGO_BusInd 62 98 160 0,61 
     Member of national delegation 108 13 121 0,11 
Member of negotiation body 111 10 121 0,08 
Exert pressure inside The negotiations 73 48 121 0,40 
Exert pressure outside The negotiations 63 58 121 0,48 
     Pushers 73 35 108 0,32 
Neutral 78 30 108 0,28 
Laggards 71 37 108 0,34 
Table 2 Frequencies for business variables, dummies.  
The frequencies for the index are similar, although the Neutral value is bigger due to also 
containing regime components with a combination of two or more of the value.  
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4 Statistical analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
The main purposes of this chapter are to present the empirical findings and to discuss them in 
light of the theoretical framework. I find that the negative relationship between laggards and 
problem change is the most robust, whereas the other results are less conclusive.  
I introduce section 4.2 by explaining how the logistic regression has been executed, by 
highlighting the choices I made during runs. In section 4.2.1 I present the results from the two 
logistic regression analyses. I first present the results from the analysis of compliance, 
providing preliminary interpretations, before I go on to present the results from the analysis of 
regime effectiveness. I then summarize the findings from this part of the analysis. In section 
4.2.2 I briefly compare the explained variance in the basic model and the business influence 
model. Section 4.2.3 is dedicated to addressing the basic model and how it responds to the 
introduction of the business variables.  
Section 4.3 briefly replicates the most important findings using a different technique, partial 
correlation. Section 4.4 compares the effects of position on the two dependent variables, and 
section 4.5 summarizes the chapter. 
4.2 Logistic regression 
In order to get robust results and to reduce the empty-cells problem that can arise when 
running many variables with a limited number of units, and in addition aspiring for high 
explained variance and goodness-of-fit, I use eight slightly different models.  
Model 0 is the basic model only including the control variables. I start with this so that I can 
get a better overview of what happens with the conventional explanatory variables when I 
introduce the business variables. In model 1 the basic model is expanded with the dummy set 
business involvement. In model 2 the basic model is expanded with the dummy set business 
position. In model 3 all variables are included in order to control for all variables.  
In model 4 I remove variables that seem unlikely to become significant (within the framework 
of this thesis). There are two exceptions to this. The first is business laggard in conformity, 
which never gets significant, but is kept because it is perceived to be a substantially important 
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variable. The second exception is connected to an important goal in this model, namely to 
achieve high goodness-of-fit. For this reason the variable decision rule is kept even though it 
never becomes significant. This change in modeling improves the goodness of fit to the best 
seen in this analysis, and this indicates that the model explains the variation in the data 
material well.  
Model 5 introduces the indexes for business position and involvement. Model 6 includes 
malignancy again; due to the sudden change in the effect of depth there is reason to control 
what happens with malignancy. This model is only shown for problem change. Model 7 
includes compliance as an independent variable and this is naturally also only done for 
problem change. 
Each model has an important purpose; however, the total impression of the relationships 
between the variables has to be drawn from the set of models and the partial correlation 
presented in the next section. 
There are two dependent variables in the analysis. They are included because I wish to 
compare them, and for this reason I have presented the effects in two columns. 
I have included two ways of communicating significance. The reason for this is that because 
there are small differences between the models there are also small differences between the 
significance. Some variables are significant according to the conventional way of yard-
sticking significance in some runs, and not significant in other, and it might be interesting for 
future research to test those who are nearly significant, with other models.  
It was tested for statistical interaction by using the function Selection on a variable for the 
business variables and the automatic function in SPSS. It did not generate anything, mainly 
due to few cases in each category (―Es‖), thus it is not presented in the analysis. 
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Table 3 Logistic 
regression 
*    =p<.10 
**  =p<.05 
***=p<.01 
Conformity    Problem change    
          
  B Exp(B) Sig H-L B Exp(B) Sig H-L 
Model 0 Intercept -1.038  .511 13.069 -.995  .421 13.232 
 Malignancy .048 1.049 .916  -.690** .502 .046  
 Uncertainty -1.846*** .158 .009  .207 1.229 .673  
 Depth 1.599*** 4.947 .000 76% .842*** 2.321 .003 67% 
 Decision rule .536 1.709 .492 N=72 .208 1.231 .751 N=94 
  B Exp(B) Sig H-L B Exp(B) Sig H-L 
Model 1 Intercept -3.609  .123 8.070 -.388  .825 9.323 
 Malignancy .349 1.418 .528  -.788* .455 .051  
 Uncertainty -1.476* .229 .083  .343 1.409 .578  
 Depth 2.311*** 10.087 .001  .765** 2.148 .037  
 Decision rule 1.046 2.845 .346  .481 1.617 .605  
 RF49_2_Mem_nat -1.478 .228 .311  .069 1.072 .938  
 RF49_3_Mem_neg 2.494 12.113 .101  -.510 .600 .568  
 RF49_4_Ex_inside .574 1.775 .627 75% -.613 .541 .366 61% 
 RF49_5_Ex_outside -1.202 .301 .322 N=57 -.132 .876 .832 N=73 
  B Exp(B) Sig H-L B Exp(B) Sig H-L 
Model 2 Intercept -2.966  .218 7.002 -.764  .689 7.205 
 Malignancy .350 1.418 .538  -.510 .601 .232  
 Uncertainty -1.482* .227 .091  .222 .722 .722  
 Depth 2.174*** 8.794 .002  .741* 2.098 .071  
 Decision rule .854 2.348 .466  .582 1.790 .581  
 RF32_push -1.250 .286 .207  .469 1.598 .460  
 RF32_neut 2.256* 9.547 .062 78% -1.032 .356 .120 63% 
 RF32_lagg -.866 .421 .312 N=54 -1.338** .262 .029 N=68 
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  Conformity    Problem change    
  B Exp(B) Sig H-L B Exp(B) Sig H-L 
Model 3 Intercept -6.093*  .075 2.430 -.954  .659 15.226 
 Malignancy .599 1.821 .401  -.392 .676 .402  
 Uncertainty -1.310 .270 .245  .357 .623 .623  
 Depth 3.801*** 44.748 .003  .784* 2.190 .094  
 Decision rule 1.407 4.085 .394  .313 1.368 .773  
 RF49_2_Mem_nat -.855 .425 .633  .190 1.210 .869  
 RF49_3_Mem_neg 3.562 35.222 .122  -.907 .404 .351  
 RF49_4_Ex_inside -3.395 .034 .120  1.452 4.272 .216  
 RF49_5_Ex_outside .050 1.051 .976  .271 1.312 .739  
 RF32_push -1.786 .168 .153  .387 1.472 .613  
 RF32_neut 4.154** 63.712 .031 84% -1.852* .157 .090 75% 
 RF32_lagg .822 2.275 .515 N=50 -2.632*** .072 .008 N=64 
  B Exp(B) Sig H-L B Exp(B) Sig H-L 
Model 4 Intercept -5.071*  .085 1.600 -1.034  .622 12.708 
 Malignancy -    -.382 .683 .412  
 Uncertainty -1.119 .327 .255  .418 1.519 .540  
 Depth 3.541*** 34.503 .001  .787* 2.197 .090  
 Decision rule 1.437 4.210 .300  .309 1.362 .771  
 RF49_2_Mem_nat -    -    
 RF49_3_Mem_neg 3.280 26.567 .135  -.987 .373 .300  
 RF49_4_Ex_inside -3.388** .034 .027  1.583 4.869 .159  
 RF49_5_Ex_outside -    -    
 RF32_push -1.608 .200 .145  .484 1.622 .496  
 RF32_neut 4.408** 82.099 .018 88% -1.824* .161 .091 75% 
 RF32_lagg 1.057 2.879 .378 N=51 -2.533*** .079 .007 N=64 
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  Conformity    Problem change    
  B Exp(B) Sig H-L B Exp(B) Sig H-L 
Model 5 Intercept -1.142   2.249 -2.151  .241 8.645 
 Malignancy -    -    
 Uncertainty -1.265 .282 .118  .186 1.204 .770  
 Depth 1.885*** 6.587 .002  .386 1.472 .344  
 Decision rule .163 1.177 .880  .712 2.038 .440  
 RF49_tri_index  .098 1.103 .800 78% -.569* .566 .069 67% 
 RF32_tri_index -.215 .807 .640 N=51 .938*** 2.555 .008 N=67 
  B Exp(B) Sig H-L B Exp(B) Sig H-L 
Model 6 Intercept     -1.817  .365 6.466 
 Malignancy     -1.080** .340 .021  
 Uncertainty     .406 1.502 .544  
 Rule depth     .383 1.467 .379  
 Decision rule     1.391 4.020 .198  
 RF49_tri_index     -.523 .593 .103  66% 
 RF32_tri_index     1.180*** 3.255 .003 N=64 
          
  B Exp(B) Sig H-L B Exp(B) Sig H-L 
Model 7 Intercept     -1.679  .479 10.110 
 Malignancy     -.693 .500 .213  
 Uncertainty     .041 1.041 .961  
 Rule depth     1.522** 4.580 .043  
 Decision rule     1.158 3.183 .361  
 RF49_tri_index     -.313 .731 .410  
 RF32_tri_index     .748 2.112 .119 68% 
 Compliance     -.436* .646 .058 N=47 
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In the following I will present the results, structured after three questions: 
1) What is the direction and strength of the effects of the business variables?  
a. Compliance 
b. Problem change 
c. Comparison 
2) Does the total explained variance of the model increase when I introduce the business 
variables? 
3) How do the control variables respond to the introduction of the business variables? 
 
 
Compliance Problem change 
Malignancy 
 
- 
Uncertainty - 
 
Rule depth + + 
Decision rule 
  
RF49_2_Mem_nat 
  
RF49_3_Mem_neg 
  
RF49_4_Ex_inside - 
 
RF49_5_Ex_outside 
  
RF32_push 
  
RF32_neut + - 
RF32_lagg 
 
- 
RF49_tri_index 
 
- 
RF32_tri_index 
 
+ 
Compliance  - 
Table 4 overview correlation direction 
 
The main findings can be summarized as follows: 
1. There is a positive relationship between the presence of neutral business actors and 
compliance.  
2. There is a negative relationship between the presence of laggards and regime 
effectiveness. 
3. The explained variance is not improving any more than we would expect when 
increasing the number of variables. 
  
 40 
4. Malignancy and depth seem to be sensitive of the business variables, but this might 
also be due to the low number of units. 
5. An interesting tendency is that the business variables seem to have opposite effects on 
the two dependent variables.  
4.2.1 Business influence model 
These analyses will mainly take into consideration the dummies, and for the most part ignore 
the indexes. I will start will compliance, considering involvement and position accordingly. 
The analysis for compliance has some inconclusive findings. Then I will go through problem 
change, considering in turn involvement and position. 
4.2.1.1 Analysis 1 – compliance  
The involvement variable does not perform the way it is expected. Two of the dummy 
variables are taken out of the analysis in model 4. The index shows no correlation with 
compliance. The expectation with this variable was that the closer they came to the decision-
makers the more the decision-makers would listen to them. This suggests a statistical 
interaction between degree of involvement and position, the more pusher you are the more 
you get involved. As mentioned earlier this statistical interaction failed to perform, but I 
decided to keep the variable because of the strong coefficients.  
There are some interesting patterns with regards to the two dummies that are left in model 4; 
―Exert pressure inside the negotiations‖ and ―Member of the negotiations‖ (RF49_3 and 
RF46_4). 
―Member of the negotiations‖ has a strong positive effect (not significant). One possible 
interpretation could be that when business actors sit in the negotiations, as representatives 
from the implementation phase, the agreement that is reached is balanced and anchored in the 
implementer. A balanced agreement that does not go too far with regards to the requirements 
is easier to enforce than an agreement that goes too far and costs too much. Having business 
actors sitting in the negotiations will ensure that the agreement is feasible and not too costly. 
This degree of involvement thus increases the likelihood for actual state compliance. 
However, when we look at the descriptive statistics for ―Member of the negotiations‖ we see 
that the number of regime components that have business actors in this category are only ten. 
So there is a strong correlation, but it is not an important feature of the data that these actors 
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have great influence. They might have, and it is likely that they do, but it cannot be concluded 
from this material. 
The effect of ―Exert pressure inside the negotiations‖ indicates a strong, negative and 
significant correlation between inside pressure and conformity. This is a ―lesser‖ degree of 
involvement than ―Member of the negotiations‖. The likelihood that the states will conform to 
the provisions decreases when business actors are lobbying inside the negotiations. It is 
difficult to interpret when the information we have is that they lobby, not which direction. 
One possible interpretation is that when they exert pressure inside the negotiations they pull 
the regime so far that it gets too demanding for the states.  
This interpretation would however assume that this degree of involvement would be more 
pusher than the ones operating as member of the negotiations. Another possible interpretation 
would assume that they have laggard attitudes and that they are so effective in blocking the 
process that the agreement will not be complied with. This interpretation is somewhat 
counterintuitive to the rest of the interpretations for compliance; which suggest that the role of 
negative and intermediate business actors is to make the agreement politically feasible. There 
is no clear interpretation from this. It is difficult to interpret these results because an 
interpretation would assume a position for the business actors either way.  
The analysis ―reveals‖ that there is more to positive and negative outcome than merely a 
simple continuum. If the governments decide to spend resources and time on making an 
international regime to protect the environment, the goal of that regime would be to design a 
regulatory framework that would generate behavior that is more environmentally friendly. If 
we assume that all states initially prefer an agreement, and all other variables were constant 
(no malignancy or uncertainty), then the goal should be met. The logical and natural 
consequence of a regime formation process is a regime, ceteris paribus. Then the success of 
that attempt, that the regime is established and the behavior is regulated, is the ―normal‖ end 
stop in the chain of event., it is the end of a linear continuation of events. If business actors 
manage to delay or hinder this process, then that is a brake in the chain of events; it is the 
―abnormal‖. 
This suggests that if business actors do intervene in negotiations it is because they have a 
desire to change that linear chain of events. For this reason it is more likely that a business 
actor that participates in negotiations are negatively programmed. This is associated with the 
default assumption that business actors are blockers, not drivers.  
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To sum up, ―Exert pressure inside the negotiations‖ gives the most reliable results given the 
number of observations on the other dummy, but the interpretation of this is highly speulative. 
If we were to read anything into the fact that the two dummies have different directions, it 
would be that the closer you are to the decision-makers the more likely it is that you manage 
to form the regulations the way you want, and then the implementation process would be 
easier. If you operate farther away, you are less likely to be able to form the agreement in 
your direction, and thus the agreement will be unbalanced and difficult for the states to 
enforce. This could be a lesson for policy-makers that strive to land on international 
agreements; if you have the implementation expertise at the table, it is more likely that you 
will succeed in implementing. This is of course under the condition that the business actors 
will not block the agreement altogether, but contribute with the necessary expertise. 
This is somewhat in accordance with the results for the position variable, or rather; it makes 
sense to view them together.  
Only one of the business position dummies is significant for conformity, the one referring to 
neutrality towards regime formation. The effect for neutrality indicates a strong positive 
relationship between neutrality and conformity. This relationship grows stronger throughout 
the analysis and eventually it is very strong. 
A possible interpretation of this result is that neutral business actors that do not push in any 
direction will contribute to a regime that is balanced and politically feasible. Because they are 
in the negotiations, or close to them at least, it is reasonable to assume that they will be able to 
provide the decision-makers with the information they need in order to find a solution that the 
implementers will be satisfied with. Or put slightly different; they can provide decision-
makers with the solution they need to be able to implement. This interpretation would be 
supporting the theoretical expectation that business actors by the virtue of controlling the 
implementation process can set the parameters for what is politically feasible.  
Another facet of this interpretation could be that given that neutrals are in an intermediate 
position, sitting on the fence, they are perhaps not against regulations per se, but against 
national regulations. They would then see the negotiations as a tool to lobby for international 
agreement, as opposed to an expected domestic legislation.  
Looking at the other positions, pusher and laggards, these are not significant, but they are for 
the most part consistent and suggest an interesting pattern.  
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The effect of pushers is negative throughout all the models where it is included, somewhat 
stronger after business role is included again in model 3. Pushers never gets significant, but 
this variable is closer to significance than laggards (p<.145 at best). 
The fact that pushers have a negative effect on compliance is consistent with the interpretation 
of the effect of neutral. Imagining a situation where the best input for compliance is neutrality, 
because of the balanced agreements that will be generated, pushers one the other hand might 
serve the role of pulling the regime so far that the compliance will be too costly. This would 
give low compliance rates, but not because the actual behavioral change is worse, but because 
the requirements are high.  
Looking at the effect of laggard in model 3 and 4, we see that the correlation between 
laggards and compliance is positive.
14
 Using the same framework as above leads to an 
interpretation that laggards will manage to make the agreement very little demanding, so that 
complying with it will be easy and cheap. An agreement that does not require much from the 
states will most likely achieve high compliance score. 
To sum up, two of the position dummies support the idea that the role of business actors can 
be to find the level of requirements that is feasible and as such is an expression of 
implementation control and expertise. The effect of pusher might indicate that business actors 
can play teams with the environmentalists to pull the agreement too far for what is politically 
feasible. These findings suggest that the business actors do succeed in influencing, because 
the interpreted effects on the compliance variable is in accordance with the desired direction 
of the influence attempts. The interpretation is based on assumptions about the nature of the 
relationship between the direction and the outcome, we believe it to be such that they pull the 
agreement in a direction that is either feasible or not. This assumption is not tested here, and 
should be tested before we can say this with certainty. There is also an assumption that is 
unevenly applied, the assumption of who represents the implementer. In the interpretation of 
the negative effect of pushers it is assumed that this group of business actors are not in control 
of the implementation process, whereas for the neutrals and the laggards it is assumed that 
they are.  
                                                 
14 The laggard variable is not entirely consistent. A curious result is that when business position variables 
are controlled for business role variables, the relationship between laggards and conformity suddenly 
change direction and become positive. It is not significant, and is probably a sign that the variable is not 
very robust with conformity. 
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4.2.1.2 Analysis 2 – regime effectiveness  
The involvement variables have mixed results. ―Exert pressure inside the negotiations‖ has an 
almost significant positive moderate effect on problem change. The business involvement 
index gets significant in model 7 and shows a negative correlation with problem change.  
A positive correlation between ―Exert pressure inside the negotiations‖ and problem change 
suggests that when business are involved in the negotiations, there is moderately increased 
likelihood that there will be problem change. One interpretation of this is that involvement of 
implementer will increase the likelihood of successful implementation. This supports the 
intuitive understanding that when you include someone in a decision process it will be easier 
to govern after the decision’s principles. 
There is a negative relationship between ―Member of the negotiations‖ and problem change. 
The fact that this is negative while the former was positive suggests that the closer you are to 
the decision-makers, the less likely it is that the regime will solve the problem. An 
interpretation of this is if you are in an insider position you are in a better position to actually 
influence the decision-makers and block the negotiations. This would assume that the insider 
position is more likely to be negative towards the formation of a regime. There should 
however not be put too much emphasis on this correlation, given that the number of units in 
this category is ten. 
The degree of involvement of these actors is not as important for the outcome of the regime, 
but it does have a small effect indicating that the closer they are to the decision makers the 
less likely it is that the regime will solve the problem. The interpretation of this is at first 
glance inconclusive. The closer they are to the decision-makers the less likely the regime will 
solve the problem. Seen together with the first result, this could indicate that the most positive 
business actors are left out in the hall. This would contradict the theory that a coalition with 
environmentalists gives business actors greater leverage. The correlation between degree of 
involvement and position is positive and robust when we control for third variables.
15
 This 
indicates that the more positive business actors are the higher the degree of involvement. If 
this is true it would support the coalition theory, and the interpretation is inconclusive. 
However, it might be that this powerful coalition is not expressed at the actual negotiations, 
                                                 
15 The average when controlling for all other variables in this analysis is .454***. 
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but is determined domestically before the state delegations arrive at the table. In that case, you 
would see no sign of this coalition in the data material used in this thesis.  
The effect for laggards indicates a strong negative relationship between laggards and problem 
change. A possible interpretation of this is that the attitude of business actors is a 
manifestation of the feasibility of a regime. If the business actors do not support the regime, 
the implementation process will be blocked. The outcome is not assumed to be a direct result 
of the lobbying, but the lobbying is an indication of what is to come. If the business actors say 
no, the regime will be difficult to implement.  
Thus, the effect of the lobbying in the regime is not the most interesting part of this finding. 
This measure is an analytical pit stop, in the sense that the relationship does not assume any 
transfer of messages, and the effect of that. It rather indicates that if business actors are 
negative in the beginning of the process, they will still be so after the regime is put in place. In 
other words, the regime does not necessarily change their incentives or the course of action. 
Remembering that the attitudes in the negotiations are assumed to be an expression of the 
business strategy, and this assumption is reasonable to make, it suggests that the business 
strategies are the same before and after the regime.  
Interpretation suggests turning the argument up side down. It is not so much that business will 
change the behavior of states, but more that regimes may not always manage to change the 
behavior of the business actors. 
Turning the argument shows that business actors are in control of the implementation process, 
and that will indirectly hamper the political process of forming a regime. This is one of the 
most important findings in this analysis. 
The effect for neutral indicates a negative relationship between neutrality and problem 
change. There is a weak positive (insignificant) relationship between pushers and problem 
change. This suggests that the negative and neutrals have a bigger influence on problem 
change than the supporters, and this lends support to the default assumption that the influence 
of business actors is primarily negative. 
Introducing the index makes me confident that the dummies have the ―direction‖ that I 
intended. The index suggests a positive moderately strong and significant correlation between 
business position and problem change, and the drive of this direction seems to be in the lower 
end of the scale.  
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To sum up on problem change: when business actors are negative towards regulations in the 
formation of a regime, it is more likely that the regime will fail in solving the problem it was 
established to solve. The index shows a positive relationship between position and problem 
change, and this is nuanced in the dummy runs where it becomes clear that it is the laggards 
and the neutrals that have that the greatest impact on the outcome. Business opposition can be 
lethal for a regime, whereas business support has a weak and insignificant, but positive effect.  
4.2.1.3 Summary 
The interpretation of the effects of position on compliance, suggests that neutrals and laggards 
manage to make the agreement feasible in the meaning not too demanding. Assuming that 
these business actors represent the implementers, this is line with the expectations. Note that 
this interpretation assumes an understanding of the correlation as a causal relationship, and we 
need to test and potentially strengthen the assumption with further research.  
The interpretation of the correlation between position and problem change, suggests that when 
business actors express a negative attitude in the negotiations, the problem is less likely to be 
solved. This correlation of events can be used to conclude that often the regime will not 
change the behavior of the business actors. 
4.2.2 Explanatory power of the models 
Model 4 aims to maximize the statistical explanatory power by removing variables that are 
not significant. Measures of explanatory power must be interpreted with cautiousness, 
especially for logistic regression, because none of the existing alternatives are very 
trustworthy (Tufte 2000:42). To compensate for the weaknesses I use two different measures. 
They correspond well most of the time, which is comforting.  
It is common to assume that explanatory power increases with the number of variables. The 
reason is that the more info you put in the model the better the model will predict the variance 
in the dependent variables. This suggests that model 3 should be the model with the best 
goodness of fit because this model includes all variables. It is however model 4 that best 
predicts, even though three variables are taken out. This might suggest that there is a better 
explanatory power when including the business variables. Looking at model 5 for conformity 
does however not support this. For problem change the same pattern emerges.  
To sum up, the explanatory power is approximately equally good with the ―business model‖ 
as the basic model.  
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4.2.3 Basic model – how does it react to the business variables? 
The main goal of this section is to discuss to what extent the control variables react to the 
business variables. Both malignancy and depth are reacting to the introduction of the business 
variables by becoming weaker and insignificant. This swinging concerns mainly problem 
change. There is however no clear pattern. 
4.2.3.1 Compliance 
The effect for depth indicates a strong and positive relationship between depth and conformity 
and it stays strong and significant throughout all the models. It gets stronger when introducing 
the business variable. This is in line with earlier research that has suggested that this is one of 
the most important explanatory variables for a successful outcome of a regime. 
Uncertainty has a significant negative effect through model 1 and 2, but loses its significance 
in model 3 when all the variables are included, and is still not significant in model 4. This 
might be due to a small sample and many variables which make it difficult to get significant 
results, because it is not that far away from being significant. 
Malignancy and Decision rule has no correlation with conformity in this analysis.  
4.2.3.1 Regime effectiveness 
For regime effectiveness, malignancy and depth are most sensitive. 
The effect for malignancy indicates a negative relationship between malignancy and problem 
change. This is in line with what was expected. However, the development of the correlation 
throughout the different models shows that malignancy is not as robust as expected. 
The negative effect of malignancy looses significance when I include the laggard dummy in 
model 2. This might suggest that the laggard dummy is closely related to the concept of 
malignancy. Substantially, this is not unthinkable, given that malignancy as a construct is 
meant to cover calculations of cost and benefit, among other things. Often it is business and 
industry actors who have to bear the costs of changing behavior. Statistically, partial 
correlation between malignancy and laggard is positive and significant (average of pearsons 
r=.33
16
), while there is no correlation between malignancy and the values neutral and pushers. 
Even though I would have expected a higher correlation if there had been a substantial 
                                                 
16 Average of control variables depth, uncertainty and decision rule.  
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overlap between the constructs, the substantial interpretation of this relationship is so intuitive 
that I would support further research. 
When I replace the dummies with the index in model 6 the effect comes back in full vigor, 
stronger than ever before in this analysis. This might be due to the fact that laggards is the 
most important value, but such an interpretation would be subject to a lot of uncertainty.  
When I introduce compliance malignancy again gets weak and insignificant. This is not so 
easy to interpret; it could suggest an overlap between malignancy and compliance, but this is 
not confirmed by the data and would not make sense. 
To sum up on malignancy and problem change, the variable looses strength and significance 
when I control for laggards and compliance. It could be interesting to follow the path of 
looking at the correlation between laggards and malignancy, to come to grips with the 
seeming instability in this variable when meeting business variables. Further empirical 
research is however needed for that. 
Moving in to the next control variable, the effect for depth indicates a positive relationship 
between depth and problem change.  
When I replace the position dummies with the business position index in model 5 the 
significance of the depth disappears. This is suggesting that the position index might affect 
depth and be underlying. The correlation between position index and rule depth controlled for 
third variable average (malignancy, majority, uncertainty) is .28***, which is normal and 
does not give reasons to assume anything extraordinary.  
When I introduce compliance, depth regains its strength and significance, more than it has had 
in any model. This is most likely due to the relationship between depth and compliance; when 
the negative effect of compliance on problem change is controlled for, the positive effect of 
depth is more visible. 
The effect of compliance on problem change is negative and significant, but not very strong. 
This is approximately the same result as in Breitmeier et al (2009), and might explain some of 
the differential effects the business variables have on the two variables. This effect is also in 
line with the argument that compliance is an expression of regimes that do not really demand 
anything from the regime, and is thus an important input to the interpretation. 
Decision rule does not seem to be correlated with problem change at all in this material; it 
does however get a small boost in model 6 where it gains strength and gets closer to 
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significance. Uncertainty does not seem to be correlated with problem change at all in this 
material. Other studies have found that there is statistical interaction with uncertainty and 
malignancy, a combination that is ―lethal‖ for problem change (Miles et al. 2002). This 
statistical interaction was not found in this analysis. The reason why uncertainty and decision 
rule are kept in spite of this is because it helps to optimize the goodness-of-fit in model 4. 
4.2.3.2 Summary of basic model  
Depth is one of the variables that actually have the same effect on both the dependent 
variables, in fact the only significant one. 
Depth has a positive effect on both conformity and problem change, and a stronger effect on 
conformity than problem change, which is somewhat surprising in the view of theory. Central 
assumptions in the regime literature deduces that depth, understood as incentive correcting 
and thus demanding, will be hard to achieve; it will lead to either non-compliance or non-
participation or a little of both. It may however lead to some problem change because the 
states try to achieve at least some of the obligations and thus it will be better than the non-
cooperative outcome. This line of thought would imply that rule depth had some positive 
effect on problem change and a negative effect on conformity. So this result is unexpected. 
4.3 Partial correlations 
Partial correlation measures the degree of association between two variables, with the effect 
of a third variable removed. The reason why I do this in addition to the multivariate analysis 
is to add transparency and to reduce number of missing. Logistic regression has a tendency to 
appear ―closed‖, in the sense that the coefficients are not a direct correlation, and controlling 
too many variables at the same time has the disadvantage of increasing the number of 
missing. Analyzing the same data with more than one technique also adds to the reliability 
and the robustness.   
In the partial correlation I use the un-dichotomized version of the dependent variable. The 
coefficient is pearsons r.  
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Control: Depth Malignancy Uncertainty Decision rule 
 
Dependent: Con Pr Ch Con Pr Ch Con Pr Ch Con Pr Ch 
Business: Neutral17 .13  .20*  .18  .22*  
 
Laggards
18 
 
-.29*** 
 
-.23** 
 
-.26** 
 
-.37*** 
 
Position_index 
 
.19 
 
.28* 
 
.27* 
 
.32** 
Table 5 Partial correlations 
There are three points to consider. First, neutral is somewhat less robust than it appears in the 
regression, but shows the same pattern. Second, laggard is more robust than it appears in the 
regression, and shows the same pattern. Third, if we compare the coefficients from the 
regression, the impression is that the effect from neutral is stronger than the effect from 
laggard. This is not the case in the partial correlations, where the coefficients for laggards are 
stronger than for neutral. This is an illustration of how one should be cautious of interpreting 
the coefficients in logistic regression isolated one by one (Skog 2004:394), and suggests that 
the most robust result is between laggards and problem change. 
4.4 Comparison of compliance and regime effectiveness 
The scope of this part of the analysis is to compare and contrast the findings for the two 
dependent variables, and suggest possible interpretations. The most striking and 
counterintuitive pattern in this regard is the opposite effect that business actors have on the 
two dependent variables. The negative attitude towards being regulated, one would imagine, 
should also lead to a lower compliance rate, but this pattern is not as clear-cut as with problem 
change. There is also a negative relationship between compliance and problem change. Due to 
the inconclusive interpretations of the involvement dummies, these are not included in this 
comparison. 
Recall section 4.3.1.3 summarized that neutrals and laggards manage to make the agreement 
feasible in the meaning not too demanding. Furthermore, it summarized that when business 
actors express a negative attitude in the negotiations, the problem is less likely to be solved 
and this correlation of events can be used to conclude that often the regime will not change 
the behavior of the business actors. 
                                                 
17 Average N=67 
18 Average N=72 
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In order to get a proper discussion of this question it is useful to recall the operationalizations 
of the variables. Compliance is operationalized as: Does the behavior of important actors 
generally conform with the provisions of the regime? It is understood that this excludes 
implementation, and that the content in the compliance construct is related to domestic 
enforcement of implementation. Problem change is operationalized as: How did the state of 
the world change during this period with respect to the problems addressed by the regime? 
Problem change is understood as change in the state of the world that can be attributed to the 
working of the regime.  
Compliance is the dependent variable that is most directly connected to the regime, whereas 
problem change is the dependent variable most directly connected to what the regime attempts 
to achieve.  
4.4.1 Position and compliance 
One possible interpretation of why these two variables react differently to the business 
variables, is that whereas compliance is a good measure of to what extent the states conform 
with the provisions, it does not measure how demanding the agreement is in terms of 
behavioral change. The treaty that is agreed upon might be shallow and not demanding for the 
states to implement (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996). In this case it will receive high 
compliance rates, but most likely not change the state of the world. More specifically, ―it is 
most useful to think of a treaty's depth of cooperation as the extent to which it requires states 
to depart from what they would have done in its absence” (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 
1996:383).  
The depth of cooperation refers to how much a treaty demands from the participant states, 
compared to what the states would have done in the absence of the treaty. The argument of 
Downs et al is that compliance is not really an expression of a real cooperation effect. 
Compliance is a result of treaties that do not demand anything from the states that they 
wouldn’t have done had the treaty not come into existence. An implication of this theory is 
that compliance will occur only in regimes that do not demand any costly behavioral changes 
within the state, thus compliance will not be followed by actual behavioral change and 
problem change. In other words we would see a negative relationship between compliance 
and regime effectiveness. This is exactly what the data suggest, and so far the theory is in line 
with the empirical results. 
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However, the theory also directly says that there is a positive relationship between shallow 
agreements and compliance, because states will only agree to follow agreements that do not 
enforce them to do more than they intend to. Accordingly, if a regime has a high score on 
compliance, the regime is most likely a shallow regime, and a shallow regime is not likely to 
contribute to solving the problem any more that unilateral provisions do.  
If rule depth, as operationalized in this analysis, is the direct opposite of shallowness, then we 
would see a negative relationship between rule depth and compliance. When the regime 
attempts to impose strict regulations on the states, they will not comply. Looking at the 
empirical findings, this is not supported. The empirical findings suggest that rule depth lead to 
compliance, and actually also problem change. Breitmeier et al (2009:20) also finds that the 
theory of Downs et al does not have empirical support.  
Apparently, then, empirical results are inconclusive on this theory.  
On the other hand, it is not unthinkable that a regime is both rule-dense and shallow. If we 
take into account the literature on voluntary provisions of public goods (Murdoch and Sandler 
1997), we can view an international agreement as merely codifying unilateral regulations. If 
the unilateral regulations are quite demanding, the codification will be too. It will then be a 
question of how much the constructs of rule depth and shallowness overlap. 
If we look at the operationalization of the variable used in this analysis, this aspect might not 
be explicitly considered; ―Compared to the density of rules considered necessary for 
managing the problems in the issue area‖ (appendix, italic is mine). One can assume that 
implicit in Downs et als (1996) understanding of deep agreements is some kind of incentive 
corrective (term from Underdal (2002a:21)). It is possible that density of rules considered 
necessary takes this demand for incentive correction into account, and thus the constructs are 
opposites on a continuum.  
The discussion did not generate any clear view of the relationship between compliance, rule 
depth and problem change, but if we do not take into account the measure of rule depth, the 
discussion does shed light over the relationship between business position and the outcome. 
According to the theory; 
Laggards will manage to make the agreement undemanding and thus generate high 
compliance rate, but such an agreement will not achieve anything with regards to problem 
change. Neutrals, or intermediate business actors, will make sure that the agreement will be 
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feasible, by creating a balanced agreement, but this agreement will not achieve much in terms 
of problem change. 
Business actors that are supporters of regulations might represent radical interests in terms of 
environmentally friendly production methods. These business actors could join forces with 
environmentalists and create a radical green alliance. Together they have the leverage to push 
the regime into adapting regulations that are very good from an environmental point of view. 
Such an agreement will suit their business. It might, however, prove difficult to comply with 
such an ambitious agreement. The pushers do not have full control over the implementation 
process. Normally the mainstream industry controls the implementation process, and they 
could possibly be blocking the states from complying. This is a scenario that will lead to low 
compliance. 
Even though this ambitious agreement will not receive a high compliance score, it might have 
some impact on problem change. This is in line with the data, which suggests a small, but 
insignificant positive effect.  
Pushers are thus assumed not to be sole controllers of the implementation, but due to their 
coalition with environmentalists, they will manage to pull the agreement very far. Because 
these business actors do not control the implementation compliance rates will still be low. But 
they do achieve something in terms of problem change, because the states will probably 
attempt to meet some of the obligations. 
Viewing the difference in the two dependent variables supports the understanding of business 
role in affecting compliance. The interpretation suggested for this correlation was that the 
business actors played an important role in determining the level of requirements. This 
interpretation is complemented with the observation that laggards not only lead to high 
compliance; they also lead to poorer problem change. Because undemanding agreements by 
definition will not lead to problem change, this observation makes this role understanding 
more likely. The fact that the variable depth performs so on the contrary of this theory, 
however, makes it difficult to conclude with certainty on this matter. 
4.4.2 Position and regime effectiveness 
One interpretation from the analysis of problem change was that the position of business 
actors could be viewed as a manifestation of the feasibility of a regime. If the business actors 
expressed negative attitudes the implementation process could yield trouble. This 
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interpretation does not assume anything else than the empirical correlation between two 
events before and after the regime was put in place, and is thus one of the strongest empirical 
results.  
Furthermore, if the regime had been an important factor in explaining behavioral change, then 
the event occurring after the regime would be different than before the regime. In other words, 
business behavior would have changed, from pursuing non-environmental strategies to acting 
environmental (for those that are correlated). This is not the case here. 
Viewing the argument in light of the negative relationship between compliance and problem 
change strengthen the idea. One possible interpretation is that problem change does not 
require that states conform to the provisions, i.e. compliance. The negative relationship 
between compliance and problem change suggests that at least compliance is not a necessary 
condition for problem change.  
If business support is a more important explanatory variable for problem change than 
compliance is, that might be an indication that the requirements of the regime, i.e. the regime 
itself, is not the most important determinant of changing the behavior of important target 
groups. The most important reason for behavioral change, in this line of thought, is 
endogenous in the target group interests. This puts Falkner’s argument that business actors 
can set the parameters for what is politically feasible in a different light.  
Because the actual behavioral change lies in the hands of the business and industry, they do 
not actually have to do anything in order to change the course of action envisioned by the 
regime. It suffices to do nothing, to not let anyone regulate you. Influence over international 
environmental on the part of business and industry actors thus does not necessarily require 
lobbying. They can influence the outcome of policy processes merely because they are in 
control of a central part of that process. 
If the business actors are not in favor of this behavioral change, they might first express this 
opinion in the negotiations, and later they will act out their power by blocking the 
implementation process. In a way, they do not have to influence other actors, because they are 
controlling the process and the behavioral change themselves. This adds support to the 
relevancy of regulatory capture. 
Business has however not been able to keep environmental issues off the agenda altogether, 
which is an indicator that they do not control the whole process. It would thus be wrong to 
characterize the process of international environmental politics as a ―supply‖ of regulations, 
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as suggested by the theory of regulatory capture. The argument of this thesis will thus be that 
it can be viewed as something in between lobby influence and regulatory capture, a weak 
regulatory capture, or a ―regulatory leash‖, where business and industry can set the parameters 
for what is politically feasible. 
4.4.3 Summary of comparison 
The first part of this section concluded that the comparison lends support to the idea that the 
role of business actors is to help determine the level of requirements in a regime. Consensus 
in combination with low requirements for behavioral change leads to high compliance when 
there are neutrals in the negotiations. However, due to lack of support when testing depth, 
which is assumed to be associated with requirements, this part of the analysis is inconclusive 
and suggests the need for studying this relationship more closely. 
The second part of this section suggested that the attitude of business actors could be viewed 
as a manifestation of the feasibility of a regime and that the regime most likely will not 
manage to change the incentives of the business actors. 
4.5 Summary 
An important finding is that the position of business actors in the formation of regimes can be 
seen as a manifestation of the feasibility of the regime, and that business behavior is often the 
same before and after the regime is established, indicating that the regime does not change the 
course of action. 
I have suggested that this finding can be viewed as a case of a weak regulatory capture, or a 
regulatory ―leash‖. Business actors can be said to have the power to block policy processes 
because they are in control of the implementation stage, indicating that the regulatory power 
of the states might not be absolutely. Business actors do not however have complete control 
over the agenda-setting stage, given that many environmental problems do reach the scene 
and generate policy processes. 
The findings support theories developed on the basis of case studies suggesting that business 
and industry actors are pivotal actors in the field of international environmental politics. 
Specifically, it serves to support and nuance Falkner’s argument that business actors set the 
parameters for what is politically feasible, and that corporate responds have an important 
impact on the effectiveness of international regimes. 
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The analysis gives less conclusive results regarding the degree of involvement and the role of 
business actors on compliance. I certainly find significant and strong correlations, but 
interpretation is inconclusive. The results for the positive business actors were not 
overwhelming, but they are positive for the outlook for behavioral change.  
A counter-intuitive finding is that compliance and regime effectiveness is negatively 
correlated, and this is also reproduced in every correlation with the business variables. It is 
suggested that this correlation can be interpreted as an expression of the difference between 
shallow and deep agreements. 
The explained variance in the basic model is not significantly improved when we introduce 
the business variables. Two of the control variables are however sensitive to the introduction 
of the business variables. 
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5 Concluding remarks 
In the thesis I have studied the influence of business actors in international environmental 
regimes. I argued that business actors have incentives to attempt to influence because they are 
target groups, and that they will most likely be able to succeed in this endeavor due to their 
central role in the implementation stage. I investigated the research question by modeling 
influence as successful attempts to change the direction of international environmental policy 
processes. I measured to what degree the business actors are involved and the direction they 
try to pull the regime in, and compared it to the outcome of the regime. This model enabled 
me to suggest that the probability of success in terms of behavioral change decreases if the 
business actors oppose the regime. 
Statistical studies within this research field would gain more credibility if we increased the 
number of units. More units will make it more feasible to do advanced multilevel analysis, 
which I believe would, at least to some degree, help solve the problem of dependency 
between the regime components. In multilevel analysis each regime would be units at one 
level, and each regime component would be units on the other level. With this technique it is 
possible to control for any similarities within each regime. Such analysis would first and 
foremost decrease errors stemming from multi-collinearity. Secondly, it could bring out some 
facets of the regime dynamic associated with phase.  
It would however also be enlightening to study some of the unanswered questions from this 
thesis in a more in-depth fashion. Whether or not the change in direction of the behavior of 
states really can be attributed to the influence attempts of the business actors is an example of 
such.   
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Appendices 
Appendix A Overview of non-state actors in the regimes in IRD  
Only provided as a courtesy, the analysis is not based on this table. 
Beige color – neutral, science or partly state 
Green color – environmentalists 
Blue color – business  
 
Regime Relevant stakeholders 
1. Antarctic Treaty Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) 
 
Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) 
 
Greenpeace 
 
International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators 
(IAATO) 
2. Baltic Sea Regime World Wildlife Fund 
 
Coalition Clean Baltic 
3. Barents PINRO (Russia) 
 
Soviet/Russian collective fishing fleet (kolkhozy) 
 
Soviet/Russian small private companies/coastal fleet 
 
Norwegian Seamen's Association 
 
Norwegian Fishermen's Association 
 
National Federation of Norwegian Fishing Industry 
 
Institute of Marine Research (Norway) 
 
Soviet/Russian Representatives for the fishing industry 
4. Biodiversity Regime UNEP 
 
World Resources Institute 
 
IUCN 
 
Greenpeace 
 
World Wide Fund for Nature 
 Third World Network 
4. CITES IUCN 
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UNEP 
 
IWMC 
 
WCO 
5. Climate regime 
Opportunist Business Actors (e.g., Solar Lobby, Nuclear 
Lobby) 
 
Pragmatic ENGOs (e.g., FIELD, NRDC, WWF) 
 
Obstructionist Business Actors (e.g., Coal Lobby, GCC, 
World Coal Institute) 
 
The IPCC alliance (Bob Watson, Bert Bolin, UK 
Meteorological Office) 
 
Deep Green ENGOs (e.g., Greenpeace) 
 
Apologist Business Actors (e.g., BP) 
6. Danube River UNEP 
 
Danube Forum 
 
EBRD 
 
IUCN 
 
Global Environmental Facility 
 
WWF 
 
World Bank 
 
UNDP 
 
UNEO 
7. Desertification  UNEP 
 
UNDP/UNSO 
 
GEF/World Bank 
 
IFAD 
 
Le Reseau d` ONG sur la Desertification et la Secheresse 
(RIOD) 
 
OECD/Club Du Sahel 
8. Great Lakes Management GLU 
 
Great Lakes Commission 
 
IAGLR 
 
National Wildlife Foundation 
 
Sierra Club 
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Council of Great Lakes Industries 
9. Hazardous Waste 
secretariat to the negotiation process and the later 
convention 
 
Greenpeace International 
 
Basel Action Network 
 
Bureau for International Recycling 
 
US Chamber of Commerce 
 
UNEP 
10. IATTC Greenpeace International 
 
Monitor International 
 
WWF 
 
Center for Marine Conservation 
 
  
11. ICCAT Natural Resources Defense Council 
 
Conservation Groups 
 
Fishing Industries of the Various Important Fishing 
Countries 
 
Greenpeace International 
12. Whaling Regime Humane Society 
 
Greenpeace 
 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature 
 
World Wide Fund for Nature 
 
International Fund for Animal Welfare 
 UN Food and Agriculture Organization 
13. London - forbrenning til sjøs 
The Stockholm secretariat (established in connection 
with UNCHE in 1972) 
 
The Permanent International Association of Navigation 
Congresses (PIANC) 
 
The International Association of Ports and Harbors 
(IAPH) 
 
The Central Dredging Association (CEDA) 
 
Greenpeace International 
 
The National Union of Seamen (Britain) 
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14. LRTAP IIASA/FoE/GP-coalition 
15. North Sea Regime The European Commission (NOT the EU) 
 
Aktionskonferenz Nordsee (AKN) 
 
Friends of the Earth 
 
Greenpeace 
16. Oil Pollution Greenpeace 
 
INTERTANKO 
 
International Association of Classification Societies 
 
International Chamber of Shipping 
 
Friends of the Earth 
 Oil Companies International Marine Forum 
17. Rhine Pollution Regime German Industrial Corporations/Associations 
 
Dutch Drinking Water Companies 
 
Dutch Social Advocacy Group (Stiching Reinwater) 
 
Dutch Horticulturists 
 
Mines Domaniales de Potasse d Alsace 
 
Environmental Protection Groups/Local Authorities in 
Alsace 
 
McKinsey Amsterdam 
 Greenpeace Germany 
18. Ramsar Ducks Unlimited 
 
Wetlands International 
 
IUCN 
 
WWF 
 
BirdLife International 
 Wetlands International (as IWRB) 
19. Black Sea Regime European Union (TACIs and PHARE programmes) 
 
UNDP 
 
UNEP 
 
Global Environmental Facility 
 The World Bank 
20. South Pacific Fisheries Regime 
DWFN fishing associations (e.g., American Tunaboat 
Association, Nikkatsuren) 
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South Pacific Commission (now from 1998: South Pacific 
Community) 
21. Ozone Regime Greenpeace 
 
Friends of the Earth 
 
Industrial Chemical Industries (ICI) 
 
European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) 
 
Dupont 
 
Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy 
22. Timber Trade Global Forest Policy Project 
 
IUCN (Quasi-IGO) 
 
FAO (IGO) 
 
The British Timber Trade Federation (important forestry 
industry association) 
 
African Timber Organisation (AFO) 
 
International Institute for Environment and 
Development (IIED) 
 
American Forest Products Association 
 
Dutch Timber Federation (important forestry industry 
association) 
 
Sahabat Malaysia (SAM) 
 
World Wide Fund for Nature (International and its 
affiliates notably WWF-UK) 
 
Friends of the Earth UK 
 
Rainforest Information Centre 
 
Trade Records Analysis of Flora and Fauna in Commerce 
(TRAFFIC) 
 
TERRA 
 
Environmental Policy Institute (Washington) 
 
World Conservation Centre (WCMC) 
 
National Wildlife Federation (USA) 
 Japan Tropical Forest Action Network (JATAN) 
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Appendix B Queries from the IRD 
Compliance query 
303 ACTOR-LEVEL OUTCOMES  
Outcome: The outcome dimension refers to the behavior of actors at both the international 
and the domestic level. Outcomes at the international level include compliance by important 
members. At the state level, outcomes cover activities of major agencies and actions of those 
affected by the regime's rules.  
FORM: RC5  
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 303A Does the behavior of important actors generally conform 
with the provisions of the regime? Did the regime exert a causal influence on these 
developments?  
Provide codes for each element.  
Distinguish between regime factors and non-regime factors in assessing the regime’s causal 
influence in this area. Indicate the basis for your judgment (documents, articles or books, 
interview notes, etc.).  
Actor behavior conforms with regime rules when it produces outcomes that fulfill require-
ments, whether or not it was intentional, whether or not the actor has a legal obligation to do 
so, and whether or not the regime had a causal impact on the behavior.  
If behavior would have been the same without the regime, the regime had no causal impact. If 
the behavior of actors conformed occasionally or even frequently failed to conform with the 
regime’s rules but conformity with the regime’s rules would have been even worse in the 
absence of the regime, we consider the regime to have had a positive causal influence. If the 
behavior of actors conformed occasionally or frequently failed to conform with the regime’s 
rules but conformity would have been even better in the absence of the regime, we consider 
the regime to have had a negative causal influence.  
Regime factors are those that stem from the regime's existence. Such factors may include 
weak or strong rules, mechanisms for technology or financial transfer, etc. that may have 
positive or negative influences on the achievement of the regime's stated goals. Non-regime 
factors are those operating outside the regime's environment but not attributable to the 
regime's existence (e.g., economic recession) that either promote or weaken the achievement 
of the regime's stated goals.  
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IMPORTANT_NATION Important nations/states identified in the precoding agreement.  
ALL_MEMBERS Provide a general judgement about all members of the re-gime.  
NONSTATE Non-state actors identified in the precoding agreement.  
CONFORMITY For each important actor listed under IMPORTANT_ NATION, 
ALL_MEMBERS, or NONSTATE, indicate whether that actor generally conformed with the 
provisions of the regime rules.  
0 = Not applicable (e.g., actor does not need to conform with regime rules)  
1 = Behavior exceeds regime requirements: The actor conforms with the regime's rules almost 
all the time and even exceeds them to a degree that is considered significant or important by 
regime members (e.g., the behavior of a number of industrialized countries exceeds the rules 
established under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 1987 
and its revisions in 1990 and 1992).  
2 = Behavior meets regime requirements: The actor conforms with the regime's rules almost 
all the time but does not significantly exceed the regime requirements (e.g., the U.S. and the 
former Soviet Union conformed with the provisions of several bilateral agreements to reduce 
nuclear weapons but did not significantly exceed the regime requirements).  
3 = Behavior conforms with some requirements but not all: The actor only conforms with 
some of the regime rules.  
4 = Behavior conforms some (but not all) of the time and/or to some degree but not com-
pletely: The actor conforms with the regime’s rules most of the time but deviates occasionally 
in such a way that is considered significant or important by regime members (e.g., North 
Korea’s behavior occasionally deviated from the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty) 
and/or conforms only to some degree in a way that is considered significant or important by 
regime members.  
5 = Behavior does not conform at all: The actor does not conform with the regime's rules to 
any significant or important degree.  
6 = Do not know  
CONFORMITY_CAUSAL For each important actor listed under IMPORTANT_ NATION, 
ALL_MEMBERS, or NONSTATE, indicate whether the regime had a causal influence on the 
degree of conformance of the actor(s).  
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0 = Not applicable (e.g., actor does not need to conform with regime rules)  
1 = Little or no causal impact: Non-regime factors mainly account for state of the world and 
regime factors do not play a role.  
2 = Modest causal influence: The regime matters with regard to the state of the world but non-
regime factors are more important.  
3 = Large causal influence: The regime accounts equally with non-regime factors for the state 
of the world or has proven to be more important with regard to the state of the world than 
non-regime factors.  
4= Negative causal influence: The regime exerted a negative influence toward conformance 
with requirements.  
5 = Do not know  
CONFORMITY_  
CAUSAL_REFERENCE Indicate the basis for your judgment (documents, articles or books, 
interview notes, etc.) for each important actor.  
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
 
Problem change query 
304 IMPACTS OF THE REGIME IN THE TARGETED ISSUE AREA  
Impact: The impact dimension includes results of the regime’s operation within its own issue 
area. Such results can encompass the regime's contribution to solving the problem(s) that 
motivated the parties to create it, the regime's contribution to learning about the nature of the 
problem, or the regime’s impacts on the distribution of values.  
FORM: RC11  
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 304A How did the state of the world change during this period 
with respect to the problems addressed by the regime? Did the regime exert a causal influence 
on these developments?  
Distinguish between regime factors and non-regime factors when assessing the regime's 
causal influence on these developments. Indicate the basis for your judgment (documents, 
articles or books, interview notes, etc.).  
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If the actual state of affairs was somewhat negative or stayed the same but the situation would 
have been even worse in the absence of the regime, we consider the regime to have had a 
positive causal influence (e.g., after the creation of the Baltic Sea Regime, conditions failed to 
improve, but the regime helped prevent deterioration). If the actual state of affairs is 
somewhat positive but the situation would have been even better in the absence of the regime, 
we consider the regime to have had a negative causal influence.  
Regime factors are factors that stem from the regime's existence. Such factors may include 
weak or strong rules, mechanisms for technology or financial transfer, etc. that may have 
positive or negative influences on the achievement of the regime's stated goals. Non-regime 
factors operate outside the regime's environment and may include developments that are not 
attributable to the regime's existence (e.g., economic recession) and that either promote or 
weaken the achievement of the regime's stated goals.  
Provide codes for each element.  
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement.  
PROBLEM_CHANGE For each problem listed under PROBLEM, indicate whether and how 
the state of the world changed during this period with respect to the problem.  
0 = Not applicable  
1 = The problem worsened considerably: During this period, a considerable change occurred 
towards (further) deterioration of the problem (e.g., problem of regional arms control: strong 
one-sided armament puts an aggressive state into the role of a regional power (Nazi Germany 
in the 1930s) or produces strong arms race with neighboring states).  
2 = The problem worsened slightly: During this period, a slight change occurred towards 
(further) deterioration of the problem (e.g, problem of preventing diffusion of nuclear 
weapons: The diffusion of nuclear weapons could not be controlled and the number of nuclear 
powers increased).  
3 = The problem stayed the same  
4 = The problem improved slightly: During this period, a slight change occurred towards 
(further) improvement of the problem (e.g., problem of an independent Palestinian state:  
In the first half of the 1990s, peace talks among Israel, the Arab states, and the PLO produced 
some progress with regard to the relationships among the parties).  
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5 = The problem improved considerably: During this stage, a considerable change occurred 
with regard to (further) improvement of the problem (e.g., human rights problems between 
East and West: As a consequence of the dissolution of the former Soviet Empire in Eastern 
Europe, basic human rights like freedom of speech or association are no longer conflictual 
issues between East and West).  
6 = Do not know  
PROBLEM_  
CHANGE_CAUSAL For each problem coded under PROBLEM_CHANGE, indicate 
whether the regime exerted a causal influence on the change of the world with regard to the 
problem.  
0 = Not applicable  
1 = Little or no causal impact: Non-regime factors mainly account for state of the world and 
regime factors do not play a role.  
2 = Modest causal influence: The regime matters with regard to the state of the world but non-
regime factors are more important.  
3= Balanced causal influence: On balance, regime and non-regime factors account equally for 
the state of the world.  
4 = Significant causal influence: The regime has proven to be more important with regard to 
the state of the world than are non-regime factors.  
5 = Very strong causal influence: Regime factors account for virtually all these developments.  
6 = Do not know  
PROBLEM_  
CAUSAL_REFERENCE For each element, indicate a basis for your judgment (documents, 
articles or books, interview notes, etc.).  
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
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Problem malignancy query 
1) 
FORM: RF7  
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 101G Regarding interests involved in the issue area: Was there 
an incentive to disobey the rules even after the regime was put in place?  
Provide codes for each element.  
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement.  
INTEREST_DISOBEY Was there an incentive to disobey the rules even after the regime was 
put in place? Provide codes for each problem mentioned under PROBLEM.  
0 = Not applicable  
1 = Very strong relevance of incentive to disobey rules even after regime was put in place  
2 = Strong relevance of incentive to disobey rules even after regime was put in place  
3 = Medium relevance of incentive to disobey rules even after regime was put in place  
4 = Low relevance of incentive to disobey rules even after regime was put in place  
5 = No relevance of incentive to disobey rules even after regime was put in place  
6 = Do not know  
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
 
2) 
FORM: RF9  
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 101I Regarding interests involved in the issue area: How 
compatible/incompatible were the interests of the parties?  
Provide codes for each element.  
PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding agreement.  
INTEREST_  
INCOMPATIBILITY How compatible/incompatible were the interests of the parties? Provide 
codes for each problem mentioned under PROBLEM.  
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0 = Not applicable  
1 = Very strong incompatibility of interests  
2 = Strong incompatibility of interests  
3 = Minor incompatibility of interests  
4 = Minor compatibility of interests  
5 = Strong compatibility of interests  
6 = Very strong compatibility of interests  
7 = Do not know  
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
 
Depth query 
FORM: RA15 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 205G Is the regime shallow or deep as measured by the density 
and specificity of its rules? 
Provide codes for each element. 
REGIME_SHALLOW Is the regime shallow or deep as measured by the density and 
specificity of its rules? 
1 = Very shallow: Compared to the density of rules considered necessary for managing the 
problems in the issue area, the regime comprises only a very limited number of rules, and/or 
established rules are rather weak compared to the specificity of the rules considered necessary 
for managing the problems in the issue area (e.g. the 1979 Bonn Convention on the 
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals is a very shallow regime with a very 
limited number of weak rules). 
2 = Shallow: Between 1 and 3 on the scale. 
3 = Medium: Compared to the density of rules considered necessary for managing the 
problems in the issue area, the regime comprises a sizable number of rules to manage the 
problem and/or established rules have developed some strength compared to the specificity of 
the rules considered necessary for managing the problems in the issue area. 
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4 = Deep: Between 3 and 5 on the scale. 
5 = Very deep: Compared to the density of rules considered necessary for managing the 
problems in the issue area, the regime comprises a very comprehensive set of rules and/or 
established rules are rather strong compared to the specificity of the rules considered 
necessary for managing the problems in the issue area [e.g., the adjustments and amendments 
to the Montreal Protocol (1987) adopted in London (1990) and Copenhagen (1992) led to a 
rather deep regime with comprehensive and strong rules]. 
6 = Do not know 
 
Decision rule query 
Decision rule FORM: RA32 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 210B What decision rules does the regime provide for and use 
in arriving at decisions? 
There is a difference between having written decision rules which are part of the regime’s 
provisions and using decision rules for arriving at these decisions (e.g., the regime’s 
provisions can provide for a qualified majority, whereas in practice states try to arrive at these 
decisions by consensus). 
Provide codes for each element. 
DECISION_RULES_ PROVIDED What decision rules does the regime provide for in 
arriving at 
decisions? Code each decision listed under DECISIONS_PROVIDED. For 
each decision, check as many as apply. 
0 = Not applicable 1 = No decision rules 2 = Unanimity 3 = Consensus 4 = 
Weighted/unweighted voting 5 = Qualified majority 6 = Simple majority 7 = Right to opt-out, 
file objection 8 = Do not know 
DECISION_RULES_ IN_PRACTICE 
DECISIONS_PROVIDED UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
What decision rules does the regime use in practice in arriving at decisions? Code each 
decision listed under DECISIONS_PROVIDED (see codes above). 
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Formal decisions called for by the constitutive provisions of the regime listed above. 
 
Uncertainty query 
FORM: RF22 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION: 104A Was the nature of the problem well understood? 
The degree of uncertainty in an issue area depends on consensus regarding the nature, causes, 
and consequences of the problem, and on consensus about solutions and what should be 
maximized in the issue area (e.g., whether the actors value protecting fish resources or 
harvesting a resource to provide food). 
Provide codes for each element. PROBLEM Problem(s) identified in the precoding 
agreement. PROBLEM_UNDERSTAND Was the nature of the problem well understood? 
Provide 
codes for each problem mentioned under PROBLEM. 
0 = Not applicable 1 = Very strongly established understanding: There was general consensus 
regarding nature, causes, and consequences of the problem, as well as regarding solutions and 
what should be maximized in the issue area. 2 = Strongly established understanding: Between 
1 and 3 on the scale. 3 = Partially established understanding: Consensus was partially 
achieved, either by consensus on some but not all of the different variables (nature, causes, 
and consequences of the problem as well as solutions and what should be maximized in the 
issue area) or by generally growing, but still not fully developed, consensus on all of the 
different variables. 4 = Low established understanding: Between 3 and 5 on the scale. 5 = Not 
at all established: Understanding was not established with regard to nature, causes, and 
consequences of the problem, or to solutions or what should be maximized in the issue area. 6 
= Do not know. 
UNCERTAIN + COMMENT 
 
